Black Sea and Caspian Sea Symposium II
Constanta, Romania

Second Conference
21-22 May 2007
Constanta, Romania

NATIONAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT
WASHINGTON, DC
The National Defense Intelligence College supports and encourages research on intelligence issues that distills lessons and improves Intelligence Community capabilities for policy-level and operational consumers.

These proceedings are from the Second Symposium on Black Sea and Caspian Sea Security Issues conducted 18-23 May 2007 in Constanta, Romania. This continued the plan of having a forum for military intelligence chiefs with an interest in the region. The resulting sharing of ideas provided all participants with a better understanding of the security issues.

This publication is almost the entirety of their presentations, and the views expressed are those of the conference participants. The views do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any domestic or foreign government or government entity.

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Dr. James E. Lightfoot, Editor and Associate Director
Center for Strategic Intelligence Research
From: General Director, Defense Intelligence General Directorate, Romania and Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, USA

To: Director of Military Intelligence [Distribution List]

Via: United States Defense Attaché [Distribution List]

Subject: Invitation to attend a Symposium on Black Sea and Caspian Sea Security Issues, 18-23 May 2007

1. Lieutenant General Constantin Croitoru, Romania, General Director, Defense Intelligence General Directorate (D.I.G.D.) and Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, USA, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (D.I.A.) are pleased to announce the second edition of the Symposium on Black Sea and Caspian Sea Security Issues, scheduled for 18-23 May 2007 at the “IAKI Hotel”, Mamaia, Constanza County, Romania.

The intent of this reunion is to continue to develop the successful academic dialogue established in the first Symposium, (Washington D.C., March 2006), as well as to promote further regional relationships and cooperation in the region.

The international impact of security developments in the area and the importance of continuing dialogue among military intelligence officials from the Black Sea and Caspian Sea nations allow us to hope that such reunions will become an annual tradition, to the benefit of all participants.

The attached enclosures provide a draft agenda (Annex A) and administrative details (Annex B).

2. The symposium is addressed to the military intelligence chiefs and a senior staff intelligence officer from each country. If the chief is unavailable, a senior deputy may participate instead. Additionally, the Defense Attaché accredited to Romania from each invited country may accompany the delegation.

In the spirit of the first edition of the symposium, this second edition will be also conducted in a non-attribution, academic environment and is not intended to be an intelligence exchange conference, rather a forum to discuss key regional security issues common to the Black Sea and Caspian Sea nations. The event will be co-hosted by the Military Intelligence Directorate (M.I.D.) – Romania and the U.S. National Defense Intelligence College (N.D.I.C).

3. Funding, including international travel, per diem, and accommodation will be the responsibility of the participants. Accommodations will be reserved for symposium participants at the “IAKI Hotel” (details Annex B).
Symposium participants should plan on arriving no earlier than 18 May and departing no later than 23 May.

During the weekend, 19-20 May 2007, a social/cultural program is scheduled in Constanza area, organized and sponsored by the host country.

During the conference days, continental breakfast and buffet lunch will be provided.

Official receptions will be hosted, on the first night of the conference, by the Romanian Minister of Defence and on the second night of the symposium, by the National Defence and Security Advisor to the President of Romania.

4. Internal transportation will be provided by the host country.

5. Military participants should wear appropriate dress uniform and civilians should wear business attire (coat and tie) during the symposium. Business attire is recommended for the evening functions.

6. For early planning and in order to guarantee accommodation, the names of participants and passport numbers should be forwarded no later than 30 March 2007.

Information should be sent to the Military Intelligence Directorate points of contact, Commander Aurel Draghici (phone 004021-3127864) or Major Dana Popescu (phone/fax 004021-3192036, e-mail: bprot@mid.ro).

7. We look forward to seeing you at what will be a most important event.

CONSTANTIN CROITORU
Lieutenant General, Romania

MICHAEL D. MAPLES
Lieutenant General, USA

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ATTENDEES

(ALPHABETICALLY BY SUBGROUP)

Cochairs:
LTG Michael D. Maples, USA
MG Francisc Radici, Romania

Cohosts:
NDIC Pres A. Denis Clift, USA
BG Gheorghe Savu, Romania

Principal Participants and Attendees:
Mr. Robert Lee Ayers, United Kingdom
Dr. Daniel Burghart, USA
Amb Sergiu Celac, Romania
Dr. Iulian Chifu, Romania
LTC Isokov Dilshod, Tajikistan
Dr. Athanasios Dragos, Greece
MAJ Muhamed Esenov, Turkmenistan
LCDR Sebastian Ezaru, Romania
Dr. Iulian Fota, Romania
COL Sergiu Gutu, Moldova
CAPT (N) Dogan Hasan, Turkey
Mr. Lorenzo Hiponia, USA
COL Hristo Kostadinov Ivanov, Bulgaria
COL Rahim Jafarov, Azerbaijan
BG Vahtahg Kapanadze, Georgia
COL A. Karapetyan, Armenia
BG Brian Keller, USA
Mr. Serghey Konoplyov, Ukraine
CPT (A) Irakli Kurasbediani, Georgia
BG Simeon Lalidis, Greece
Mr. James MacDougall, USA
GEN (Ret) Sergiu Medar, Romania
Defense Minister Teodor Melescanu, Romania
LTG Lysenko Mykhailo, Ukraine
Amb Larry Napper, USA
Minister Ioan Mircea Pascu, Romania
BG Dan Plavitu, Romania
COL Gocha Rafiani, Georgia
U.S. and Romanian hosts (first row) pose with the principal attendees of the Black Sea and Caspian Sea Symposium on the steps of the IAKI Hotel. Hosts on row one include (left to right): Gen (Ret) Sergiu Medar, Romania; Mr. A. Denis Clift, USA; MG Fransisc Radici, Romania; Defense Minister Teodor Melescanu, Romania; LTG Michael D. Maples, USA; BG Gheorghe Savu, Romania; BG Brian Kellner, USA; BG Dan Plavitu, Romania.
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Welcoming Remarks

Brigadier General Ph.D. Eng. Gheorghe Savu

The second edition of the “Symposium on Black Sea and Caspian Sea Security Issues” represents for me a unique opportunity to express my gratitude for all the participants and, at the same time, the special honor of opening the sessions of this international meeting, which, owing to your presence, reaches a truly academic, ideational and scientific level.

The beginning of the third millennium has imposed a dynamic and omnidirectional approach, correlated with the evolution of the security environment for provisioning and defining national, regional and global security architectures.

Within this context, strategic information plays a crucial part, both for the identification and knowledge of risks and threats and the development of an open and coherent regional and international communication that has to ensure new security instruments.

Romania’s geopolitical and geostrategical position, as a NATO and EU member, offers the opportunity and the unique responsibility of getting directly involved in the processes of maintaining and consolidating regional and subregional security, together with its partners. Only a common effort of all those who are involved can ensure the economic and social development of the states from the region.

The issue of Black Sea and Caspian Sea security cannot be analyzed without taking into consideration three different aspects, as follows: insecurity flows (threats, risks and vulnerabilities), regional energetic and natural resources flows, and strategic intelligence flows, which should allow a common effort in the field.

The presence of the regional states and the United States’ representatives at this symposium proves, once again, the extraordinary importance of the region for the configuration of common security and the creation of...
the instruments for cooperation and support in order to reach progress and development.

From the point of view of providing regional security, which could trigger the premises for a stable economic and social development, rigorous activity of all state and non-state players is necessary in order to identify, know and combat threats, risks, and vulnerabilities, especially those that are asymmetric, or transnational.

Once again, I would like to thank you all, who have answered our invitation and agreed to participate in this symposium, which honors us and represents a commitment for us. Moreover, I express my conviction that this activity will be a genuine workshop for the exchange of ideas and the identification of viable solutions in order to define regional security.
President A. Denis Clift,  
National Defense Intelligence College, USA

General Radici, General Maples, ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues, as co-host with our Romanian partners, I am very pleased to welcome you to the 2007 Black Sea and Caspian Sea Symposium.

Since last year’s symposium, the College I lead has been freshly chartered by the U.S. Department of Defense with a new name — the National Defense Intelligence College — and with expanded mission and responsibilities, to include further growth in our international programs.

Through the College’s Center for External Engagement, we are expanding our dialogue with friends, colleagues, and experts around the world. We are entering new academic partnerships — with the Institute of the General Intelligence Agency of Mongolia, to cite one example.

We are participating in critical thinking, research, and discussion on key issues of the new era through international gatherings such as this symposium in Constanta. We do so with the clear understanding that together we can accomplish far more than we can working alone.

When we met last year, the conferees looked at the political economic and military dimensions of the Black Sea and Caspian Sea region. We addressed the region’s high conflict potential; its conflicts frozen in time; and the diverging strategic interests and orientation of its members.

Last year’s speakers described the strategic, growing importance of the region’s oil and gas reserves, and the region’s environmental challenges.

We examined the historic transportation routes cutting through the region, the routes used to move oil and gas from the region; and the routes used for the illegal movement of weapons, illegal human trafficking, illegal drug trafficking, and the use of those routes by the perpetrators of international terrorism.

Of importance last year, we looked at the first steps toward greater regional cooperation:

• the naval presence of Operation Black Sea Harmony;
• the work of the Black Sea Coordination and Information Center in Bourgas, Romania;
• and the growing role of BLACKSEAFOR, the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group.

At last year’s symposium, we agreed that the door to information exchange and cooperation could be opened much further, that there was much more to be done.

In the intervening months, we have watched the dynamism, the pace of events continue to unfold in this region — the signing just two months ago
by Russia, Bulgaria, and Greece of a new oil pipeline agreement bypassing the Bosporus being one example.

This brings us to the promise of our deliberations today and tomorrow — and our goal of turning items on this excellent agenda into actions and understandings furthering more tangible cooperation, stability, and well-being in the region.

Thank you.
The first panel of this symposium will be moderated by His Excellency, Ioan Mircea Pascu. Mr. Pascu will lead the discussions on an interesting and important topic: “Security Issues in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea Region — Vicinity Zone for NATO and EU.”

His colleagues in this dialogue are prestigious experts: His Excellency, Ambassador Sergiu Celac, Mr. James MacDougall, and Mr. Iulian Fota.

After being Minister when Romania became a NATO member, and now being a European Parliamentarian, I feel like Luis Figo who has left Barcelona for Real Madrid. But in any case, I will try to give you a little bit of a perspective from the European Union point of view.

Let me introduce to you Mr. James MacDougall, who is now visiting faculty at the Department of National Security Studies at National War College, and who previously was in charge of many of the problems of this area, in his position as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense for Eurasia between November 2003 and March 2007.

The topic we have been asked to address today is security issues in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea Region, the Vicinity Zone for NATO and the EU. We might slightly amend that to say Proximity Zone for NATO and the EU, which I think, would be a little clearer.

I’ll address NATO issues; however, I will defer to my EU colleagues for EU issues although I may make some glancing remarks.

But I will address the issue more from a political level. I don’t intend to get into the nuts and bolts of the hard core security issues, many of which General Maples very accurately elucidated, the narcotics threat, a variety of
transit threats through the region, certainly the WMD threat which Dan Burghart outlined in a hypothetical situation. I would like to talk more about the political dynamics in the region and the possibility of potential threats from that field.

I would like to remark on a few fundamental facts that I try to keep in mind when I think about this region, and I think would be useful as a general context. First, if we were to look at a physical globe, leaving aside the borders and the nation states, the first thing that would occur to us is that when we get beyond the Black Sea to the Caucasus, and beyond to the Caspian and Central Asia, we have a region that is landlocked.

Every state in Central Asia is landlocked. Uzbekistan, twice over; every state it borders is landlocked. The Caspian Sea itself is a landlocked sea. It has no access to the world's oceans. Azerbaijan is landlocked. Armenia is landlocked. Georgia has access through the Black Sea to the world's oceans, but then when we go to the Black Sea, we know that it has very narrowly defined access through the straits of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles.

So this landlocked status creates certain issues right away that we have to address, the first being that the region is largely inaccessible by sea. This has implications for military deployments as we have learned in deploying forces to Afghanistan. It's largely been done by strategic air. This requires overflight, refueling access, ground access to support lines of communication and logistics—all very complicated and all requiring partnerships with all states in the region.
The landlocked status also plays out when we look at the oil and gas resources of the region and efforts to get them out to the market. The large map very well illustrates the issues there and the various plans and contracts to move oil and gas out of the region. I will defer to Ambassador Larry Napper in the second panel today to discuss energy issues.

As we have discussed, the region is a transit zone for nefarious items, drugs, weapons of mass destruction, etcetera.

If we switch then, from a physical globe to a political globe, and we take into account the states on the map, the nation states, we are struck by the fact that, in physical terms, the globe changes very little over time. It’s relatively stable. There is erosion of coastlines, there is expansion of deserts, but largely, the orientation of large land masses, continents to water, is static over time.

In contrast, the political globe is very dynamic. Just in our own time, the fall of the Soviet Union has resulted in 15 new states. A number of states formerly part of the Warsaw Pact, are in fact genuinely free and independent. They weren’t during the Cold War.

I think if we looked at probably any 15-year period or 20-year period, as we step back in history, we will see there is a tremendous dynamism to the political, to the give and take of political units in the world. In the Black Sea, we have six countries where once there were four, the Soviet Union, Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria. In the Caspian Sea, we have five countries where there were once two.
Both of these regions, however, exhibit a certain amount of instability. And this led one of our leading thinkers on the region, Zbigniew Brzezinski, in his book *The Grand Chessboard*, to call this region the Eurasian Balkans. Why? Because historically, the dynamics that have dominated the region have been the competition of rival empires. There are ethnic, religious, and national divisions that have created tension over the years. With the fall of the Soviet Union, while some people talked about the end of history, in fact, we have probably seen a return of history that was subsumed during the Soviet era.

When we look at the Black Sea region and the Caucasus, we can think historically about at least ten Russo-Turkish Wars fought to control the northern and eastern approaches to the Black Sea. Throughout the 19th century, there were persistent Russian efforts to advance towards the straits, and indeed control the straits. This raised concerns, particularly in England and France, and led, in the middle of the 19th century, to a coalition of England, France, and Austria-Hungary, joined laterally with the Ottoman Empire, to fight Russia in the Crimean War.

This Crimean coalition led to Russia's defeat and the Peace of Paris in 1856. In the Peace of Paris, the most important clauses were the neutralization of the Black Sea. Russia and other nations, but particularly Russia, were not allowed to have warships on the Black Sea, nor fortifications on the Black Sea.
I raise this not to digress into seemingly ancient history, but I will return to this later because, for the 20 years after the Peace of Paris, Russia was very much an unhappy state, a revisionist state, and for 20 years, every issue in Europe for Russia was seen through the prism of the Treaty of Paris and the Black Sea neutralization clauses. But, as I said, I will return to this a little bit later.

In the Caucasus and the Caspian we also had the give and take, the ebb and flow of empires, the Ottoman, Russian and the Persian Empires. There were four Russo-Persian wars, the last ending in 1828 in the Treaty of Turkmanchay, which made the Caspian Sea a Russian lake, so to speak. The Persian Empire was forbidden from deploying military or naval forces on the Caspian Sea. The borders of modern day Azerbaijan were largely determined in this treaty between Russia and Persia.

Given this context, let me now turn to the modern day and talk a little bit about what I see as some of the larger dynamics in the region. First of all, I think we should note, as we talk about NATO and the EU and the region, we see a steady expansion of both NATO and the EU into the Central and Eastern European region. And I think that is accurate as of today, but we can well imagine, during the Cold War, the entire northern shore of the Black Sea being part of the Warsaw Pact, and Turkey being the eastern flank of NATO.

Now, of course, NATO is moving around the Black Sea. Of the six modern countries on the Black Sea, three belong to NATO. Both Georgia and Ukraine, at various times, have expressed an interest in NATO. I understand
they both have a way to go, but particularly in Georgia they want to move towards a NATO membership. In Ukraine, there is a struggle for the future of Ukraine, an internal struggle which we note and recognize.

And then, of course, there is Russia, which has a special relationship with NATO through the NATO-Russia Council, but which more recently has expressed serious misgivings about the continued expansion of NATO and NATO activity.

In the Caucasus and Caspian region, every country is a member of the Partnership for Peace. These countries coordinate with NATO. They are involved in many NATO programs, some more than others, but every state, particularly Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Kazakhstan, are working quite well with NATO. I will leave the discussion of the EU to my colleagues, but I think it’s a similar situation.

In contrast to what I said about the ebb and flow of empires of history, I would like to point out that NATO and the EU are voluntary associations of countries. No country has been coerced into joining NATO or the EU. Countries largely express an interest, are required to meet certain standards, and when they do are offered membership. So it isn’t an imperial standard that we see here in the advance of NATO in the EU.

I would like to express what I believe is a general U.S. interest in the entire region. And I think it’s an interest shared by both NATO and the European Union—to see the development of independent, democratic, stable, and prosperous countries, increasingly integrated into world economic and security institutions.

The world has changed dramatically. We know that. There was a very good discussion on the boat yesterday about some of the challenges of globalization, some of the challenges of the speed of information and the volume of information, trying to understand this, trying to sort this into some kind of usable product, usable to decision-makers and our leaders.

As the world transforms, all of our countries individually, and all of our institutions, multilaterally, have to transform with it. I think that is axiomatic. When I look at the past, it’s not with nostalgia for a simpler time, but I look to the past for clues, some guideposts to the future.

As we look to the future, for instance, NATO is no longer an organization solely designed to defend against an attack from the Soviet Union. It’s an organization now that is taking on increasing responsibilities in Afghanistan, an out-of-area operation for NATO. It is a tremendous challenge but one, I think we are addressing along with our partners here, the other NATO allies. The asymmetric threats, on which I know Professor Dan Burghart has a panel, are being addressed by NATO.
So the questions that come to my mind when I think of NATO are—What is the future of NATO? Will NATO continue to expand? What are the logical limits to the expansion? Have we already reached them? I mentioned that both Ukraine and Georgia have expressed an interest in NATO membership. The U.S. policy statement on this has been, and remains, the door to NATO membership is open. Secretary of Defense Cohen, when he was in office, liked to add that the door to NATO remains open, but it's located at the top of a flight of stairs, maybe a steep flight of stairs, and aspirants have to get up the stairs in order to get in the door. As I said, Georgia has certainly moved a considerable way up the stairs, and other countries are not far behind them.

But there is, in addition to the technical requirements of membership, a certain political question here that we all have to ask ourselves. What is the logical limit of NATO? And is the Caucasus region part of Europe, part of NATO, potentially? Central Asia?

I think there is a certain unanimity that the Balkans region is part of Europe whole and free, despite some continuing difficulties there. We have the Adriatic Three, Croatia, Albania, and Macedonia, moving quite rapidly towards NATO.

We also, at the same time, have lingering conflicts. We have the issue in Kosovo, which is coming now to a political head. I don't think I need to say...
this to anyone in the room, but it will be a very difficult process. The recommendations from President Ahtisaari of Finland will be for some sort of independence for Kosovo. Russia has said that if the Serbians don’t back this, they won’t back it. This will lead to, I think, quite a political situation in the United Nations Security Council, and I don’t know exactly where that will go.

This slide represents the frozen conflicts in Eurasia, or in the Black Sea/Caspian Sea region. Each one of those conflicts could, potentially, be impacted by the precedent that Kosovo settlement will make. And I know, having talked to most of you, Moldovans, Georgians, Azeris, and Armenians, that this is a very sensitive subject. So we are coming to, I think, a very critical political moment on Kosovo, and on the region as we move forward.

Just a word about these separatist conflicts. I think Mr. Clift alluded to them when he said they had been frozen in time. And indeed they have been, for some 15 years now. The question I pose to you, and I do pose this as an open question—What can we do collectively, what can we do as a group, to try and move these conflicts towards some sort of settlement? And let’s include Kosovo as we move in that direction.

Let’s take Nagorno-Karabakh as one example. We have a process within the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, a mixed group of 15 nations headed by three co-chair nations, Russia, United States and France. Despite considerable efforts by all three of those co-chairs, and by the entire group, the conflict is still unresolved.

While we are encouraged from time to time by some positive statements from Yerevan or from Baku, the fact is, it doesn’t seem to be any closer to resolution than it was, say 10, 12 years ago. Do we need a different group? Do we need to move this out of the OSCE? Have a different co-chairman process? I don’t know, but this is an open question. And in my mind, and I can say this now because I am no longer an official of the administration but an academic, it seems to me that Turkey should have a more direct role in this issue. Relations between Turkey and Armenia are critical.

If we look at Nagorno-Karabakh as the single biggest obstacle towards closer integration of the Caucasus region, which is by the way the link between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea regions, of course we have Russia with a direct interest, but Turkey also has a direct interest. We recognize the difficult relations between Turkey and Armenia, but having Turkey on the side doesn’t seem, to me at least, to contribute to solving the problem. I think, politically, we need some new thinking on these conflicts if we’re going to try and promote stability and prosperity throughout the Black Sea and the Caspian region.

One of the single biggest issues in the region is proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and elements thereof. Again, Dr. Dan Burghart raised
a very interesting scenario yesterday, and it was encouraging to hear the dis-
cussion of it. I might add to that particular discussion that, while Dan raised it
in hypothetical terms, with five different transit routes by which WMD might
move from Russia to Turkey, there are some practical real world experiences
in this regard. Georgia, we are aware of, has interdicted at least twice, radio-
active elements on their border with Russia, heading south. But it would be
very interesting for the rest of us, at the appropriate time, to hear from our
Georgian colleagues. How did you interdict that? What role did information,
information sharing, human intelligence play? How exactly did you interdict
those elements? We could all benefit from that experience.

But again, think of the geography. In Russia there is quite a surplus of
nuclear, biological, and chemical materials from the Cold War. To the south,
in the Islamic Crescent, we know there is a demand for these very elements.
So again, based on the strategic geography, for these elements to get from Rus-
sia, and I certainly don’t mean to indict Russian controls, and we’re working
with the Russians very closely and energetically to try and control these ele-
ments, but there is a supply or potential supply and demand, and this passes
right through this region that we are here to discuss. So it is imperative for all
of us to work together on border controls and information sharing, to deal
with these elements of WMD.

What I want to do is mention a specific incident of this and a specific
U.S. policy designed to counter it. It is one which you have all heard about,
our plan to deploy a limited missile defense in Europe. We know Iran has
missiles, ever increasing in range as they develop. We know they are pursu-
ing nuclear or military nuclear technology and other technologies. And given
that dynamic, it is a matter of time before Iran has the ability to launch a mis-
sile with either nuclear or some other WMD payload.

So, along with our decision to protect our homeland with missile
defense, we are now committed, after discussion with allies, to pursue a for-
ward-based missile defense system in Europe that would protect against a
launch from Iran. It would protect both the United States and our European
allies. In this region you might say, if the interceptors are in Poland and the
radar is in Czech, you fall a bit under the radar here, because you are closer to
Iran. And that is true; I recognize that. But I should say that, at NATO, there
is a discussion on theater missile defense and lower altitude defenses that may
be applicable to this particular area. But that is a discussion that NATO will
still have to have.

We’re working very closely with our allies and friends to deploy this
system. And I should say, the system, just to be clear, would consist of ten
interceptors in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic. An X-band radar
closer to Iran may be a third element to be discussed in the future. It’s not
imperative, but it would help the efficiency of the system, and I know we have discussed it with some of you here in the room.

As you know, Russia has reacted very strongly against the deployment of this system. We have been in consultation with the Russians for at least two years. When I was in a position of responsibility, I was in on discussions of this. More recently Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of State Rice have been to Russia to discuss this. President Bush and President Putin have talked about this. Still Russia, to date, is dead set against this deployment.

As close as I have been to the issue, I can say this isn't a technical issue. Ten interceptors in Poland would not effectively degrade Russia's offensive missile capability. They have hundreds of missiles and still some 2,000 or more warheads. So I don't believe this is a technical issue. I believe it is, in large part, a political issue. And it's a political issue about the future of Europe and the future of Eurasia.

On the theoretical side, and I don't want to get into the theory of nuclear warfare, but throughout the Cold War both sides, the Soviets and the Americans, were deterred by a doctrine called Mutually Assured Destruction. Both sides knew if one were to start the war, both sides would be annihilated. A balance of terror, it was called colloquially. Not a particularly happy scenario, but one that seemed to have caused both sides to exercise extreme caution.

If a state such as Iran had a nuclear weapon, we're not convinced that there would be this same caution, that the deterrent effect of our arsenal would be enough to cause them, A, not to use it, and B, certainly not to threaten countries, European countries, the U.S., with a weapon. And I think if we look at the suicide bomber mentality and extrapolate that to the level of a suicide bomber with a nuclear weapon, it's extremely troubling. And we feel compelled in the U.S., to do what we can to combat this. That's part of the philosophical basis for this missile defense.

In North Korea, and I had the opportunity to travel there just recently, they have spent 30 years developing nuclear weapons. If we can degrade those 30 years of effort with deployment as we have in Alaska of missile defense elements, it does two things. One, it devalues the threat potential of those weapons, and two, it deters other states who may decide they want to pursue a nuclear weapon. In the North Korea case, they have largely mortgaged the entire country against these weapons, and you still wind up with a weapon that is less than effective because we have some sort of defenses.

Again, I don't want to get into the theories of nuclear strategy, but we believe there is a strategic basis for missile defense and a practical basis for basing it here in Europe. It's to maintain the indivisibility of European
and U.S. security. It’s not simply to defend the U.S. And while we recognize Russia’s concerns, we’re committed to trying to work through them with the Russians. But at the end of the day, I think Secretary Rice said it quite clearly, we don’t intend to give Russia or anyone else a veto over what we believe to be the security of our homeland and the NATO alliance.

I want to say a few words now about Russia, and I should say I understand it is bad form to talk about a country that is not in the room. And I regret that. I’m not a diplomat, but I think colleagues, who have been in other meetings with me before, recognize that I wouldn’t say anything different if the Russians were in the room. I’m happy to meet with them and say the same thing. And I’m not raising issues that are anti-Russian, but largely rhetorical questions: Where is Russia going? How do we understand where Russia is going? How do we react to it or adjust to it?

Some of you who have been to St. Petersburg may recognize this statue of Peter the Great, the Bronze Horseman. You may have heard me quote this before, but Pushkin in his poem “The Bronze Horseman,” asks rhetorically “Whither dost thou gallop proud steed? And where will you plant thy hooves?” I think it’s a question we can ask ourselves today. And in the context of Peter the Great and Pushkin, Peter the Great was trying to drag Russia towards Europe. After all, that was the whole point of St. Petersburg, the window on Europe.
But I think as a rhetorical question, it is applicable today. I have spent most of my adult life studying the Soviet Union and Russia, and I’m left, in the last couple of years, with Where is Russia going? How do we understand this?

This gentleman, this statue or this bust is half a mile down the embankment from the Bronze Horseman in front of the Admiralty Building in Petersburg. It commemorates the Czarist Foreign Minister Alexander Gorchakov. Why do I raise this?

Gorchakov has taken on a central prominence in Russian foreign policy in the last ten years. This statue was placed there in 1998. Then, I believe, the Foreign Minister Primakov, started a series of Gorchakov lectures at the foreign ministry. The Russians minted a Gorchakov medal that has been awarded to senior world statesmen and other officials.

Why is Gorchakov important, and how might he help us understand what is going on today? If we go back to the Crimean War, I told you for 20 years the Russians were very upset at the conditions that they were forced to agree to at Paris. They largely withdrew from European politics, and Gorchakov was asked about Russian’s sullenness. His response, in French, the diplomatic language of the day was “Russia doesn’t sulk, she concentrates her forces.”
In 1870, some 14 years after the Peace of Paris, Gorchakov with the approval of the Czar, issued a circular to all European capitals, and it said simply, “Russia no longer will be bound by the Treaty of Paris, and calls for a European-wide conference within one year to renegotiate the security parameters, the security arrangements in Europe.” Indeed, within a year a conference was held in London. Based on a different situation, a different constellation of power than existed 14 years earlier, the European security terms were renegotiated, giving Russian a much greater role in abrogating or overturning the Black Sea clauses on neutrality.

Gorchakov then, and today, is considered a hero for this. There is a certain strain of Russian foreign policy called Gorchakovism. And I maintain that this, perhaps, is one way to try and understand the current moves by the Russians.

I had the good fortune to be in the very interesting meeting in Munich when President Putin made his speech. Some of you may have been there. If so, I think you also found it fascinating. But his discussion, his statement that Russia will hold the terms of the CFE Treaty in abeyance until such time as other states start observing the terms, unmistakably echoed Gorchakov in the Gorchakov circular of 1870. I don’t think there is any question about it, that this is the model being used.
Now, what does this mean? Perhaps this is all just historical trivia. I don't think so. In the 1990s, Russia was weak after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia was disoriented, and the Russians agreed or were largely pressed into agreeing, to many things that 15 years later, flush with petrodollars, they no longer feel they can live with.

If you analyze President Putin's speech very carefully, you'll find he is calling for a renegotiation of the rules of engagement in Europe. We hear the Russians calling now for relations based on interest and not values. By the way, the NATO-Russia Council founding document says it's founded on a mutual understanding of values. But in any case, I believe the Russians want to renegotiate, or at least reorganize, the security arrangements in Europe. I would be interested to hear what you think. You who have been here, you who were part of the Warsaw Pact, you certainly know the Russians better than we do.

But if in fact this is the case, what do we do about it? This remains a very serious question. As much as I have been able to think this through, I believe that the independence of all the regional states is of paramount importance. We should continue to seek every opportunity to engage with the Russians because I don't believe anyone here is anti-Russian. We should seek to engage with the Russians where we can, where our interests allow us to, but at the same time, be firm on supporting the independence of all regional states, particularly those closest to Russia. Particularly those, for instance, Georgia and Ukraine, which have expressed aspirations to join the western community, the European community. To my mind, the freedom and independence of those states will reverberate in Russia. In other words, it will dampen the imperial tendencies in Russia.

I will end with an anecdote, and I won't mention the country. During the Soviet days there was a story in one of the capitals of a neighboring republic to Russia, one of the Soviet Republics. There was a queue waiting for a bus and it was a perfectly bright sunshiny day. The third person in the queue had his umbrella over his head. And his neighbor said, my friend, it's a perfectly sunny day. Why do you have your umbrella up? Ah, he says, it's raining in Moscow.

Humorous or not, I think as we proceed in Europe, as we sit here and think how we're going to cooperate, we can't be oblivious to the weather in Moscow. We have to take this into account. We have to try and understand this, and develop an approach to the Russians that will somehow reduce the threat that they perceive, and try and enlist them or convince them to cooperate on these issues, for instance, proliferation and counter-terrorism, issues that are important to all of us. As we go forward, and as we look at these asymmetric threats, I think it is important and this is why I raise this in this context, I think it is important to understand that the post-
Soviet world that we have gotten used to for 15 years, is about to change, and change in a way that reflects more of the 19th century world. That is, centers of power, centers of power that are interested in spheres of influence, and this will be a difficult challenge for all of us on a political level, and also maybe on the military level.

**MINISTER PASCU:**

It's indeed a privilege to hear historical references coming from an American, to a people who like to live in history rather than in the present, especially in this part of the world. But in any case, it was very instructive because this indicated the milestones of history along this way.

I would add that Gorchakov was the foreign minister who communicated to the British, in writing, that Afghanistan was outside the Russian sphere of influence. And that was one of the first instances in which sphere of influence, as a concept, was officially used.

I think you know that the main goal after we liberated ourselves was to become secure by the time Russia comes back. And to us, this meant to be members of NATO and members of the European Union. Now, some of us are members. Others are moving in that direction. But I think that the main point is that we see these two organizations as the security and prosperity guarantee for ourselves. And, therefore, it would be for nothing if we see that our position within those organizations is somehow a lesser position because Russia would like to see it that way. And this would really nullify our efforts. I think that this is important.

As for the frozen conflicts, let's wait and see what the impact of global warming is on that. Is it positive or is it negative? Should we keep them frozen, or should we let global warming unfreeze them, and try to deal with them?

**AMBASSADOR SERGIU CELAC:**

It is indeed a privilege to talk to such a distinguished audience because being a layman myself and a classical diplomat, as they say, I have come to understand and admire the fact that you are not only the eyes and the ears but also, to a large extent, the brains of the military establishments in your respective countries.

I think that the subject that you have chosen for debate today, and the combination of the two regions that, until recently, have been considered separately, the Black Sea and the Caspian region, is most welcome, especially since this is the second meeting of its kind and, according to General Maples, there will be a third meeting as well.
It is important because, increasingly, on both sides of the Atlantic, and also in the regions themselves, these twin regions are seen more and more as part of a single geostrategic and geopolitical space.

It is interesting to note that recent policy papers and academic research are increasingly seeing the link between the two regions and considering them as one. There may be some influence of Brzezinski’s thinking in this, but it is also a reality which becomes more and more obvious. And the reasons for that are three.

First, energy is being increasingly perceived as a national and international security issue for the 21st Century. The G8 summit in St. Petersburg last year concluded that a new balance is necessary and, in fact, is in the making between the interests, responsiveness, and practical behavior of the producers, consumers, and transit countries.

Views on what is a legitimate interest for each of the group of three may differ. And some tensions in this interim period, until things settle down in some sort of a mutually acceptable agreement, are likely to persist. But sound and responsible management is certainly needed in this period of transition to a new state of affairs.

The second reason for the permanence of those two regions worldwide is the nexus between international terrorism and organized crime, and the fact that the two threats to regional and worldwide security and stability are seen as two faces of the same coin. Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of Afghanistan, for instance, where the main source of support and material sustenance for the Taliban resurgence is opium production and trade.

Third, we have to deal with a new set of non-conventional threats. Recent events in Estonia and the cybernetic attack on government institutions, banks, and even on some of the government agencies related to security, gives one a reason to think twice about what may follow. Clearly, it was not an all-out attack. It was not cyber war. It was a shot across the bow. It was a warning shot of what can happen if the matter is not taken seriously. The evidence of state sponsorship in the attack on Estonia is patchy, and, to some extent irrelevant, and to a large extent, deniable. That makes it so serious.

I think this is one of the subjects for possible cooperation between military intelligence agencies, including exchange of information and exchange of technologies, because we have just been given notice that this may happen.

When I served as ambassador to London, Mr. Savu was a colleague, and I remember talking to the Estonian ambassador to London. And he told me very proudly that because of the scarcity of highly skilled personnel in the state administration and in diplomacy, they were forced by circumstances, by
their poverty of resources, to go electronic. And therefore, I think Estonia is one of the most vulnerable countries. Not surprisingly, it happened in a place that is vulnerable. But in this, we are all vulnerable. The more sophisticated our communications information and decision-making, our electronic system and e-governance, the more vulnerable we are.

Having said this, I would say that a commonly agreed perception of the existing dangers to national and regional security and stability is a necessary requirement and also a very powerful incentive for joint cooperative action. Meetings like this fit this desirable pattern. And the regional approach, a collective approach, to our responses to perceived threats, brings added value to individual efforts.

Now let me say a few words about the regional picture that we are witnessing today. My focus will be primarily on what the European Union is doing and likely to do, because I understand we shall have a more extensive presentation on NATO. But let me start with a general view of the way the Black Sea Caspian Region is going.

If you look at the World Bank’s recent statistics, you see that most of the Black Sea Caspian Region has seen dynamic economic growth in the past years in terms of GDP, second only to the region of East and South Asia, one of the most dynamic regions of the world. And that applies to resource-rich and to resource-poor countries as well.

The development of a resource-poor country, like Armenia, almost matches the very fast double digit, constant double digit development of an oil-rich country like Azerbaijan. So, this is an additional incentive to think about the benefits of cooperation between those two — potential benefits.

What is interesting is that this economic growth, after a very painful decline after the breakup of the Soviet Union, was accompanied by better macro-economic indicators, improved logistical and regulatory frameworks and, to some extent, institutional performance. This also applies, thanks to the Partnership for Peace, to the military and security establishment. Still, progress has been uneven between and within countries, with large disparities. And the transition to market economies and functional democratic governments has not yet been completed. There are still important setbacks in terms of human rights, freedom of the media, and even governance accountability and transparency.

In all the countries of the region, there appears to be a consensus that the current threats to regional security and stability are perceived at three distinct levels. First, those that derive from global trends, not the least climate change, which is at least partially responsible for the crisis in Darfur in the Sudan. This created new migration patterns and pressures, which led to conflict.
Second, threats caused by factors that are external to the region, such as the fallout of events in Afghanistan, and also increased drug traffic through the region. And finally, those that arise from internal developments in the countries of the region and outstanding unresolved problems between them.

In practical terms, we have to deal with a combination of all these three categories of threats which, because of the peculiarity of the region, are both conventional and nontraditional in their nature. Meaning that we still have to deal with old fashioned threats of military confrontation and shooting wars in the region.

Now, let me say a few words about the involvement of external international actors in regional stability. In the recent past, the European Union's external action has continued to be hobbled by the ongoing constitutional crisis. The European security and defense policy and the common foreign and security policy of the European Union have not yet matured because of constitutional obstacles and also because of certain differences and turf battles between the Council Secretariat and the European Commission, in terms of foreign policy design and implementation. However, some practical positive steps have been taken, particularly in the past year or so, with a new concept of the European neighborhood policy adopted in December last year. And with the more recent Black Sea Synergy, a communication of the European Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, which is definitely a step forward in a more forward-looking approach to the region as a region, and not as individual countries.

NATO policies in the region have followed a cautious pattern, mostly dealing with individual states. I would have to add that the Partnership for Peace and its follow-up programs have been an untrumpeted, but at the same time, an enormous success. In practical terms, PfP has proved to be a brilliant idea, well implemented, and really appreciated in the entire region. It has made a difference and is likely to continue to do so.

On the United States side, we have the general perception in the region, at least in academic circles, that the U.S. administration has been too absorbed with its ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to develop a coherent and forward-looking strategy for the region. Sometimes one has the impression that the various actions and initiatives, while sound in themselves, are hardly coordinated in a long-term vision.

There have been meritorious attempts to move ahead towards a common view, a strategic design of the West for the Black Sea and the Caspian Region. Together with Minister Pascu, we were involved in both the first and the second strategy documents, which started under the aegis of the German Marshall Fund of the U.S., which started under the premise that in order to
be effective, the strategy should be a strategy of the West, meaning the United States and Europe together.

There is enormous value added in such an approach. And we, in NATO and EU, see that very clearly from the vantage point of our geographical position and the margins of both EU and NATO, and with a vital interest in having good and stable relations with our neighbors further east.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as a regional security organization, has proved increasingly ineffective and is in real danger of falling into total irrelevance.

Now Russia is not an external actor. Russia is a part of both the Black Sea and the Caspian region. I had also written down in my notes the name of Prince Gorchakov. I think your analysis on the historical relevance of past events is to the point and very much alive and openly admitted as such by the Russian policy makers.

China is also becoming more active in the region, although China is more likely to be absorbed for a while with assimilation of its own western provinces. But Chinese interests, including energy interests in some of the countries of Central Asia, have been forcefully affirmed in recent years. Currently, we have to deal with an unhappy situation in the bilateral relationship between Russia and both the United States and the European Union and NATO. There has even been some talk of a return to a Cold War in new circumstances, which I think is, for the moment, exaggerated.

It is important to see that in terms of big strategic issues, the current turbulence is over relatively minor matters, from the point of view of global strategic interests. And that leads us to draw the interim conclusion that what is happening now is positioning for a new bargain, the same as Prince Gorchakov did. Although what the bargain is going to be, and what the aims of that bargain are, is still a mystery. Because for the moment, we know, or we are told, what is not liked, but we are not being told what they would like to see done.

Now, what is to be expected? Usually, when you go to your desk and prepare some possible scenarios for the future, you have to engage in the worst possible scenario, because that is your responsibility and national security interests are at stake. However, sometimes we neglect the best possible scenario, which is also a possibility. Moreover, putting forward better scenarios, more optimistic scenarios for the future, is more likely to generate a self-fulfilling prophecy. Because if you say this is the future I would like to see, then people may share that and start working towards it. This is sometimes called normative focusing.

My first suggestion is that the European Union becomes a lot more active in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea region. In fact, the recent communi-
cation of the European Commission on Black Sea synergies mentions specifically the link between Central Asia and the Caspian basin. This activity or rather activism on the part of the European Union, although belated, appears to be serious and based on an awareness that long-term fundamental interests of Europe are at stake precisely in this future.

Until recently, the U.S. was leading the pack, telling the Europeans, this is in your interest. We are trying to help you. Now, with the two recent communications of the Commission, I think Europe is catching up. A new fresh conceptual look by the United States at what is at stake in the Black Sea and the Caspian region may be advisable.

After taking over from NATO and the United Nations in the Western Balkans, the European Union can be expected to use the acquired experience in the Balkans. And, therefore, we can expect some sort of even limited constitutional arrangement, which would put additional muscle on the European Security and Defense Policy, and on Common Foreign and Security Policy. The consensus and the progress made on the battle group concept is an early indication of that.

Also, interestingly enough, the two latest communications of the European Commission that are relevant to the region mention specifically the intention of the European Union to get involved, hands-on and much more seriously, in helping resolve the frozen conflicts in the region.

Second point is that closer cooperation between the European Union institutions and NATO is also in the cards because it is based on a more acutely perceived commonality of interest and also on pragmatic considerations of cost-effectiveness. Slowly, progress has been made, and a certain convergence can be seen between ESDP and NATO operational concepts.

In the relations between the European Union and Russia, the very recent summit in Samara has not been a resounding success. However, if you look at the facts on the table and you set aside the rhetoric, a breakthrough on a new legally binding arrangement between EU and Russia to replace the Common Partnership and Co-operation Agreement is a distinct possibility. The differences are not as fundamental as they may appear. Some progress on that matter may have a very favorable impact on regional developments, provided the European Union stays united and future agreements are based on real and mutually shared values.

Having recently become a maritime Black Sea power, the European Union will certainly push on with its comprehensive maritime policy, including its physical security components. It will be interesting to see, in particular for our Turkish colleagues as aspiring EU members, how the expanded operations of the European Union under the European Security and Defense Policy
will interact with the existing Black Sea Four and Operation Harmony. How will they fit into the known limitation of the Montreux Treaty?

Finally, the United States — Russia relationship has not been exactly a honeymoon in the past several months. But it is interesting to speculate whether a U.S. — Russia rapprochement, based on a pragmatic understanding of mutual priorities, may occur, possibly sooner rather than later, starting with the turning down of rhetorical pronouncements.

It may be tempting for both incumbent administrations to set, in the final stages of their respective presidencies, the outlines of a new bilateral agenda, including arms control, confidence-building measures in the military field, and Russia’s eventual accession to the World Trade Organization, together with Ukraine and Azerbaijan, the remaining nonmembers in the region, which will help create additional incentive for a cooperative approach.

I continue to believe that a concerted strategic vision by the European Union and the United States in the region is of enormous practical importance. It will not have to be limited to energy, which currently overshadows all other interests and priorities of action, but may cover a broader scope of activities, including regional security concerns.

Finally, I also think that we can expect an in-house role for regional organizations and initiatives. Personally, I am familiar with the experience of the organization of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC). I have been working for that organization for four years now. Maybe our colleagues from the Caspian region should consider where BSEC has failed on security matters.

The basic BSEC document mentioned that among the main purposes of that organization are regional security and stability. However, an attempt to produce, between 2002 and 2005, a policy paper on security and stability, could not, while agreed upon at expert level, get to the higher echelons of political decision-making. The harder aspects of regional security and stability remain totally outside the BSEC agenda and will require some formal or informal arrangement to discuss those issues.

The issues I have in mind are a group of three fundamental issues, which are also applicable to parts of the Caspian basin. Those are the frozen or other latent conflicts, without duplicating the existing international authorities or negotiating formats, but just creating a forum where the regional interests can be voiced. Practically, there is no place for the regional countries to give their political signals from within the region as stakeholders about the frozen or other potential conflicts. The OSCE is almost dead. The United Nations is not feeling well either.
The BSEC is taboo. We have harmony in the BSEC, because the agenda of the BSEC excludes from the very start any controversial issue. So it is beautiful. We talk about interesting matters, but not about those that are vital. Nobody is happy with the status quo. That is so clear. Second, we have to have somewhere to discuss the application to the region of the international standards on the mandate and national composition of peacekeeping forces. We have a very strange phenomenon in the region, with so-called peacekeeping contingents that are highly nontransparent and certainly not accountable.

Third, although the issue has been on the table for years, it has now acquired an acute character, that is, the regional implications of the Conventional Forces of Europe Treaty (CFE). We have to start talking openly about what kind of arrangement may replace an essentially Cold War arrangement between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty.

We all want a happy Russia. The question remains, what makes Russia happy? We, on our part, are well disposed to being accommodating and open-minded about a possible compromise solution. But we, the countries in the region, would like to know what the conclusions of possible negotiations of the subject are going to be. It is, after all, not only global security that is at stake, it is also our own national security in this region.

MINISTER PASCU:

I would like to say a couple of words on the European Union. Ambassador Celac has mentioned what happened with the computers in Estonia; this is also a test of the responses of both NATO and the European Union. This is heralding a new era. It’s true, as was said, that the Crimean War put this area on the map. Apparently it gets put on the map every 150 years. We are now in the second phase, and we are benefiting from it. But in any case, then and now, you see the implications.

Outsiders were barred from getting direct access to the area. Now the entry of outsiders into the area is pushing for a new balance between the countries around the two seas and the outsiders. This balance is in the making. It is in the making.

This is very important for the European Union because the European Union has a number of layers of relationships with Russia. For instance, we have the strategic partnership between EU and Russia. We have the northern dimension of the EU, which is engaging Russia. If we want, indirectly, even the Mediterranean dialogue is also relevant to the relationship with Russia, and all of a sudden, more or less, we now have this area as another component of the dossier of relationships between EU and Russia.

There is a new type of interaction with Russia in this area, and the impact of this new addition to the general relationship between the EU and
Russia is something the EU is not used to having with Russia. And I think that this is something which we have to watch, the tendency of the commission to speak on behalf of the European Union, to elaborate strategies, common strategies. You see, we have a common European security strategy, but we don't have a common market in this respect.

So, I think the issue of the commission is to speak for all, to elaborate documents which would represent EU as such. And then there are the capitals to which a country like Russia is appealing. And when Russia is saying in Samara that, look, there are some countries who would like to disturb our cozy relationship with the capitals in the Union, it is addressing those entities who are practically running the show. And, therefore, the idea is indeed important, and we have to take into account all of these mechanics, but also the political implications.

Two more things. I think that we cannot exclude the Danube from the picture. And if there is a third edition to this, because we have Black Sea, we have Caspian Sea, and now we have Black Sea and Caspian Sea, then we have to add the Danube to this. Because the Danube, as General Maples has mentioned, is really the corridor, the European corridor.

The approach of the European Union is already reviving institutions which otherwise have been more or less just existing in the area like BSEC, up until now. The European Union and its money have resuscitated the activity of the existing institutions and BSEC among them.

We do not, and we cannot expect, the area to become integrated and defined as such, in order to really have a nice approach to the area, support the area, and so on and so forth. The identity of the area, if it is to be built, will be built around the projects, which the European Union and other entities and countries will have for this area. And they will engage all the parties and countries.

**MR. MACDOUGALL:**

I would echo what Minister Pascu said, and also a point very well raised by Ambassador Celac, on the issue of the cyber attacks in Estonia. I know that many of you are probably thinking this discussion is a little too political, a little too policy oriented. We're looking for concrete actions that we can do. And I think that is a very clear area, where there might be a basis for cooperation.

I don't, based on my experience, know exactly who on the U.S. side is involved in defending against cyber attacks, who has responsibilities for this area, but many of you are probably involved in this. And we have, of course, U.S. colleagues here in the room who could discuss this with you. And to my mind, this is a very concrete area of potential cooperation that has been raised
by the ambassador, and I would just ask that you follow up on that in your discussions, or maybe in the question and answer period after.

DR. IULIAN FOTA:

My intention is to present a scholarly and personal view on the Black Sea and on the Caspian Sea and on the security issues important for this region of the world. I will start my presentation with this map, trying to tell you a little bit about the importance of the Black Sea, not necessarily from a regional perspective, but from a global one. In the past, the importance of the Black Sea was mainly a regional one; but I think that we are already witnessing the importance of the Black Sea from a global point of view. On the one hand, the Black Sea is, as Robert Kaplan visiting Bucharest some years ago said, the stable periphery of the Greater Middle East. On the other hand, in the Black Sea from the globalization point of view, we have two groups of countries. One, a group of countries already participating in globalization and already having benefits from it. Romania is a good example. But we also have countries that are still looking for being connected to globalization, or even countries that are rejecting globalization. Globalization will definitely play a role when we talk about a Black Sea and Caspian Sea.

This is another map of the Black Sea area at this time. In the past, the Black Sea was always a region. We used to consider the Black Sea our region. What I think is very important is that today the Black Sea is also a region for the international community, for NATO and the EU. Why are the
Black Sea and Caspian Sea strategically important today? I think we have three groups of reasons or considerations. Some of them relate to conditions after 9/11. Some others, a second group which I call evolutions, I will present immediately. And finally the last group of arguments is a mixture of the first two groups.
After 9/11, there were very clear reasons for considering the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea very important. The first reason is energy. Energy is a very common issue today and a very important one. We have very interesting maps showing us how many stakes we have in the region from the energy point of view. The Black Sea definitely is a very important area for the transit of energy, as well as the Caspian Sea which is a very important area for energy production.

So, after 9/11, and also as a result of globalization, the importance of the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea has increased very much in the last few years. Another reason for the Black Sea to be considered very important is counterterrorism. There are already a lot of published materials showing how, in the Black Sea, terrorism is an increasing issue. There is a lot of public information about all the important terrorist organizations operating in the Black Sea and about how easily these organizations have access to weaponry. Counterterrorism will be one of the very important tasks of international cooperation in this region.

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is also an issue underlying the importance of these two seas, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. Probably you are aware that one year ago, The Economist, the well-known British magazine, ran a test in one particular area of the Black Sea to see how easy it would be to buy military hardware. It was the case, if I remember, of a missile, not a very powerful one, but strong enough to be used, for instance, for terrorist activities against airplanes. With a small amount of money, two
reporters succeeded in buying the weaponry very easily, demonstrating that in the Black Sea region, when you speak about proliferation, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, you have a problem.

Another area is the traffic in drugs, weapons, and people. And unfortunately, if you ask countries from the area, especially the police or the border protection troops, they will tell you that we have increasing trafficking of drugs or people. And that is an issue, a very important issue, for the future, because I think that if we do not take the right measure, and if we do not act in a very drastic way, it is possible to expect a continuous increase of activities in this area.

Finally, frozen conflicts are on my list. I think some of the frozen conflicts are artificial ones which maybe is good news, because being artificial, they could be solved. But on the other hand, maybe it's not very good news, for the moment not many are interested in these conflicts being solved.

The second group of arguments emphasizing the international importance of the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea is related to the enlargement of NATO and the EU. In the past, Turkey was the only NATO country bordering the Black Sea. With Romania and Bulgaria joining NATO, the number of countries bordering the Black Sea has increased. Starting with this year, the first of January 2007, when Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU, the EU is bordering Black Sea. And I think the fact that the EU is bordering the Black Sea is changing the attitude and approach, not only of NATO, but also of the EU officially. Finally, I think, the Black Sea is important because in the Black
Sea, for the moment, we have a nexus among all these issues. So the region today is geopolitically very significant, precisely because it is a crossroads of cultures, of international trade, of ideas, and of influences.

So, what does this nexus of the Black Sea mean? Romania and Bulgaria are members of NATO and the EU, as I said. Ukraine is looking to the

- Bulgaria and Romania are members of NATO and of the European Union (EU).
- Ukraine is caught between the West and Russia.
- Georgia leans toward the West but is under severe pressure from Russia, which endangers its sovereignty and territorial integrity in the secessionist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
- Turkey and Russia vacillate between East and West, pulled in different directions by history, religion, national interests, and national pride.
- The Black Sea’s six littoral states (Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, and Turkey) are beginning to construct a tentative regional identity.

NATO and the Black Sea

Summit of Istanbul June 2004 (para.41):
- Underlined the importance of the Black Sea for the western security
- Member states and partners are already cooperating in the area.
- NATO ready to support the consolidation of the current regional cooperation
West, but is also being cautious about how to manage relations with Russia. Georgia is closer to the West, but the process is not without pains. And Turkey and Russia are changing their attitude towards the area, as well as toward the West. And countries from the area are looking for a tentative regional identity and cooperation, trying to be more and more active, and consolidating their cooperative role in the area.

At the NATO Summit in June 2004 in Istanbul, NATO underlined for the first time, officially, the importance of the Black Sea for western security. We had NATO participation and involvement in the Black Sea before 2004, but during the summit, for the first time, NATO underlined the importance of the Black Sea as a region for western security.

Also, as part of that paragraph, NATO underlined the fact that it is already cooperating, and it is already present in the area with different activities. NATO also declared its availability to support the consolidation of the current regional cooperation.

Cooperative Partner in 2003 is an example of the fact that NATO was already participating in, and hoping for, cooperation in the Black Sea. Also, in some other fields, such as the scientific field, NATO has a lot of projects run by the NATO Science for Peace program, or by some other NATO bodies. These are very important projects because some of them are focused on issues of common interest for all the countries in the area, for instance, environmental protection. This was very helpful for promoting or developing regional cooperation.
A few words about the EU, which finally decided just a few weeks ago to adopt and to promote a strategy on the Black Sea. It is called “The Black Sea Synergy.” I think this is a very relevant fact, because it is the first time that the EU is underlining and accepting the importance of the Black Sea as a region. The document was released by Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the European Commissioner for External Relations.

The EU response
“The Black Sea Synergy”

- The draft text of the "synergy" envisages regular meetings between foreign ministers of Black Sea zone states Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova as well as the EU “troika” of the EU presidency, the office of EU foreign policy envoy Javier Solana and the external relations commissioner.

The ministers will aim to agree new projects for bringing in fresh supplies of gas and oil from the Caspian Sea basin, soothing separatist tensions, curbing illegal immigration and smuggling, promoting human rights NGOs, fighting environmental crimes and building new transport links.

- The EU-led club will not have its own building or secretariat but will try to galvanise political agreement for actions to be implemented by existing institutions, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation group (BSEC) or the Black Sea Forum (BSF) and co-funded from the EU’s "neighbourhood policy" budget.
First, the EU is proposing regular meetings between foreign ministers of the Black Sea countries with the EU “troika.” This is a big chance for being sure that we will have regular meetings at the level of the EU’s most important institutions, like the president of the commission and Javier Solana with foreign ministers of the Black Sea countries.

Second, the meetings will be focused on addressing practical problems of the Black Sea area, including gas and oil, separatist tensions, illegal immigration, smuggling, and human rights.

Finally, the EU will be focused not on inventing new institutions or on inventing a new cooperation format, but will insist on having an important and useful tool to work the so-called neighborhood, an EU neighborhood policy. The EU will insist on supporting and helping the existing cooperation organizations to do their job. By this I mean the BSEC, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation group, the Black Sea Forum, and some other institutions already existing in the area.

The role of Russia

"We want to have the Russians on board, but this is different to the Northern Dimension," an European Commission official said, referring to another forum for Baltic Sea projects where Brussels is on equal footing with Moscow. "The Black Sea Synergy is an EU initiative, so Russia will play a different role."

This document is very important because it underlines the fact that Russia will play a different role. Some of you are familiar with the fact that the EU supported, in the past, and helped the northern countries to develop what was called the Northern Dimension, and the European Commission played a very important role in promoting that Northern Dimension. The project focused on the Baltic Sea. Russia, from the beginning, was part of the project. Russia was on equal footing with Brussels on that project. This project, the
Black Sea Synergy, is an EU initiative, so Russia will definitely be invited to play a role.

What is the weak point of the European Union approach at the moment? We know that the EU is good at producing very useful and important papers. But we do not always have strategic action after the European Union produces these very important papers. So, I think for the next few months it will be very important to see what kind of concrete action, what practical action, the EU will propose, to be sure that this Black Sea Synergy will have a follow-up and will bring some real results to the table.

What I think is very important for the future is for us to insist, for our countries and for our organizations, to insist on building a new security culture in the Black Sea. This security culture is very important, not only for international stability and globalization, but for our own citizens.

I think that it will be very important in the future to have an agreement to build a new Acquis of Security Policy. This word “acquis” is from the French language. The idea of European “acquis communautaire” means a certain set of norms or rules accepted by countries. If they want to establish a community, acquis is very important to establishing and to building the European Economic Community.

I think for our countries, if we want to build a community around the Black Sea, it is also important to look at what I call the “New Acquis of Security Policy.” And this security policy acquis has five important elements.

The New Acquis of Security Policy

- Security + Prosperity
- The multidimensional concept of security
- Focus on the citizen and the quality of life
- Civilian leadership and democratic control
- Integrated management
  nationally (interagency cooperation) and
  internationally
First is the connection between security and prosperity. In our countries, we have to speak and to work very clearly on building not only security for our countries, but also prosperity, because poverty, I think, could be a very serious threat to our nations’ security.

The concept of security should be a multidimensional one. If you take a country like Romania, for instance, some of the biggest threats we have faced in the last few years came from nature, from floods and other natural disasters, and not necessarily from abroad.

The focus of our security policy should be on the citizen. And this is a very practical way of evaluating the quality of our security policy. If the quality of life for the ordinary citizen is increasing, we will know that our security policy is on the right track. But, if after some years, the quality of life is declining, then we need to address questions regarding the quality of our security policy.

Civilian leadership and democratic control are important. I think integrated management is also very important for our security policies. We need to integrate our security policy nationally, meaning, in the western understanding, interagency cooperation. But also we need international cooperation.

I think it is very important for the Black Sea to address the issue of modernization of military education. Romania is a good example; we received a lot of support from western countries on modernizing our military educa-

**Modernization of military education**

- IMET
- ESC “George C. Marshall”
- NATO Defence College
- PfP Training Center 1997
- Defense Resources Management Center 1999
tion. We still have things to do. The more we extend cooperation in the Black Sea area in this field, the better it will be for our countries.

And there are examples in other areas. For instance, due to our location, Romania is also involved in Central European Cooperation. For the first time, we will have a meeting of the defense academies and colleges of Central Europe, where we will look for ways of increasing our cooperation.

I think what can be done for the Black Sea in the future will be to extend and to increase contacts and cooperation at the level of military education, which could have a positive influence on interplay among our countries. I think encouraging or having a better cooperation between the government and the academics in our country, even establishing a partnership if possible, could help cooperation around the Black Sea.

In Romania we are trying to encourage a transition from non-governmental organizations to think tanks. We try to encourage some of the non-governmental organizations to stop producing alternative political thinking and to start engaging in a partnership with the government. And there are successes on promoting the interests of Romania abroad, based on this cooperation between government and non-government organizations or think tanks.

Finally, some challenges. One of the important challenges for the future, I think, is the fact that the West is not in a very good situation when it comes to leadership. What I mean by western leadership is that there are
some important countries where, due to the political situation, we will have elections, and until these elections are finalized and we know who is in power, I don't expect increased participation and initiative.

Also, I think Russia is a challenge. We are already witnessing in Moscow the end of transition. In Europe, the question for many years was what kind of Russia will we have? What path will Russia follow? We are now in a position to say something about how Russia will be for the next years and how we will act. We know the structure of power in Moscow. We know the ideology. We know the culture, including the political one.

Turkey, I think is the most important country in the Black Sea for the moment. And Turkey is needed for any kind of cooperation in the Black Sea. Without Turkey, cooperation in the Black Sea will not be very effective. I am underlining this fact because there are some areas where, for the moment, Turkey is still evaluating its cooperation.

Finally, a factor which may not be very familiar for those coming from the West, but I feel in our countries there is a kind of transition fatigue. It is many years since our countries began this transition. Even for countries like Romania and Bulgaria, who have already joined NATO and the EU, this kind of fatigue is visible. And that is a factor to be taken into consideration because, if you look at the citizen on the street, he/she is already expecting benefits and is hoping for a different life from that of the past. The success of cooperation in the Black Sea will be very much influenced by the attitudes of the citizens.
**MR. MACDOUGALL:**

In all three presentations, similar threats, challenges, and dynamics in the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea region were identified. The importance of cooperating, to try and overcome or to meet these challenges and take advantage of opportunities, was highlighted. I want to make a special note that Dr. Fota placed importance on military education in the IMET program. I'm sure that some of you have already taken advantage of the IMET program, but I think within the intelligence sphere, that is a potentially very useful tool.

I would also like to echo, Doctor, your point about the importance of Turkey. So far, we have made little mention of Turkey, but I think you are right on the mark that Turkey, for the West, is probably the indispensable country in the Black Sea region. We look forward to hearing from the Turks at some point about their view.

I think we have opened up a pretty wide range of possibilities for discussion, but I would to ask General Maples, the chairman, and Mr. Clift, the director of this symposium, if they care to make any remarks. Following that, I will identify one or two areas where I think we could have a useful discussion and maybe take a few questions.

**LTG MICHAEL D. MAPLES:**

We have identified a number of challenges as they are today and as we have seen them. But I think also in the threads of what has been presented, we see a number of opportunities that are being offered as suggestions. We have heard those in terms of the possibility of other forums that might consider these issues. We have discussed or heard of the periods of transition, and I thought your slide on transitions was very important because we are seeing a change in time, a transition period perhaps coming to an end and other transitions that are taking place. Many points were brought out in these presentations that really provide an opportunity for us to discuss further how we can move forward in terms of cooperation. So, thank you to the members of the panel.

**COL SERGIU GUTU:**

Black Sea Synergy, the communication of the European Commission, one thing that I wanted to add is that there is money attached now. Because when everything appears in print, you get a budget. I saw this budget already and there is an opportunity to at least share some costs and promote Black Sea original ideas, besides United States money.

There is another opportunity to promote ideas. The Black Sea Trust was established, I think, last year during the Black Sea Forum for Co-opera-
tion and Partnership. This was done at the initiative of Romania. I believe it has already started to consider some grants.

Another important point concerns the cooperation in different spheres like think tanks and NGOs. For those who would like to know more about that, there is a great initiative which was done by one of the management initiatives in Brussels with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania. And I know they have already done one such integration of bringing NGOs and think tanks together, which sometimes are much more flexible than your governmental agencies in those countries, and much more willing to participate in and discuss particular, security issues. That would be another integration. They do an excellent job in presenting different scenarios from which governmental agencies like yours could benefit.

So there are a lot of opportunities. What is missing in the Black Sea is a good promotion for good cases, successful cases. There are plenty, and we need to know about them, we need to talk about them. One of them is the SECI Center, which is also in Bucharest. It is an excellent organization, which already provides good records of what could be done if countries sit down together.

This is another area where, by the way, Russia could be actively involved. It should not be political, not about a missile shield in Europe or something similar, but let’s say about civil emergency preparedness. This is something where Russia could not feel threatened by the political ramifications of working together, and instead focus on avoiding, or preventing, or dealing with the consequences of different disasters.

**MR. MACDOUGALL:**

There are, I think, an increasing number of forums where Black Sea and Caspian Sea issues are discussed. These are all useful leads.

**BG BRIAN KELLER:**

Perhaps this is a question more for my colleagues around the table, so I will ask your opinions on this. It seems to me, as we discuss Caspian Sea and Black Sea security, that, beyond the Russians, someone else is missing—the Iranians. Why would we not want to encourage, even as observers, perhaps, a key partner in any kind of discussion on security in this region? Why not at least consider in the future an Iranian viewpoint, even if it is from academia or from someone else not with the government of Iran? I think it might be useful.

More importantly, I would like to hear your thoughts and discussions on the future. Because certainly, there are political considerations today from my government’s perspective and, as a simple soldier, I won’t get involved in
higher ranking political decisions. I'm a soldier and will follow the orders of my president. But I think it's important for all of you to at least contribute or think about why, perhaps in the future, we would want to have some kind of participation from Iran.

**BG DAN PLAVITU:**

I am General Plavitu, Deputy Chief of the Military Intelligence Directorate, Romania. Thank you very much, General Keller, for raising this point. I would like to say that we thought about this, and that it is very important really for all of us that all the important actors are at the table to exchange opinions and to know each other. Unfortunately, as you know, up to now, we have no defense attaché in Iran, but we have started to open the relationship at the intelligence and military level. And we hope that at the next meeting we will have the occasion to invite Iranian representatives. We need to be together with all actors.

**MR. MACDOUGALL:**

I might note that at the Munich Security Conference held annually, there has, for the last two years, been an Iranian diplomat there. And there recently have been some very interesting exchanges between him and Chancellor Merkel.

But on this point, perhaps I could ask the Azeri, Armenian, or Turkmen representatives to comment, because all three of you border Iran. Maybe you have some views about Iran or about the utility of trying to engage Iran on some of these security issues.

I would like to change the general focus to what we can do for the common good of all the countries that are represented here. I do appreciate your comments, but I would like to try and bear in mind this general observation as we continue our discussions.

**DR. ATHANASIOS DROUGOS:**

I am a little bit skeptical. The Iranians have a defense attaché in Athens, who comes regularly to various social events. He is deeply connected to Ahmadinejad's regime, and I can tell you that the last couple of years he hasn't produced any different thoughts or ways of asking about the American positions and the probable Israeli reaction to the Iranian nuclear program. I think that it is time to wait and see about the Iranians. There are three open issues. One is the very provocative nuclear program of Iran and the continued enrichment of uranium with more centrifuges. So we have to keep an eye on the Iranians and what they are doing.

Second is the chance for a dialogue concerning Iraq. As we know, there were some recent talks at the Samara summit and in Egypt, and also
some other talks to bring some kind of stabilization to certain parts of Iraq, and attempts to open a low level dialogue between the Americans and the Iraqis with the Iranians. I’m not sure if in the end these will be successful. For years, as you know, the Iranians have been falsifying data and deceiving, especially in the nuclear program. So I would like to see some results first coming from the Iraqi dialogue about stabilization in Iraq. You can’t go on inviting the Iranians to contribute on various issues because I’m not sure what they want and how exactly they think about that. If there were to be a deterioration of U.S.-Iranian relations, and Western relations with Iran, then what next?

So, I think that it is better to wait and see if there are any results from the dialogue between the United States, Iraq, and Iran and other regional powers like Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. For me, the main problem remains the provocative statements from the Iranians concerning their enrichment and nuclear activities and their secret programs in uranium or plutonium.

So, let’s wait and see. I’m working almost daily on the Iranian nuclear program in Athens, following the events, and I would like to keep a distance to see if the Iranians really want to change the balance and to be less provocative in the Gulf area and also in the global agenda.

MR. MACDOUGALL:

If I may, I would like to return to two points that came up earlier. The first is a continuation of Professor Burghart’s discussion yesterday. I mentioned that in Georgia there were actual cases of interdiction of radioactive materials. I’m wondering if the Georgian delegation is in a position to discuss that and can offer any sort of advice we can draw on as a group. That was a successful national event for Georgia, and we would be interested to hear about that.

CAPT DOGAN HASAN:

I would like to touch on three points. One, with regard to the potential role for Turkey to play in terms of contributing to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. You mentioned that Turkey can assist in solving the conflict.

It has been described as a new and different approach to Armenia by Turkey. Maybe it could be called stopping the isolation. In fact, Turkey was among the first countries to recognize Armenia as a neighbor, as a neighboring country, at the beginning of the 1990s. But in the time frame since, we have faced a number of difficulties stemming from Armenian politics and attitudes.

The first one is the so-called Armenian genocide issue. I don’t want to get into the details of that point. I think this table is not appropriate for a
discussion on that. As long as the so-called Armenian genocide claims continue, it will not be possible to open the door for Armenia.

The second problem is the recognition of the common border between Turkey and Armenia, those border lines that were drawn by the Kars Treaty of 1921. We need to receive clear messages that Armenia recognizes the current border. This point should be clarified by Armenia.

The third point with which Turkey has a problem with Armenia is the continuing occupation of Azerbaijani national territory. This should be ended. Then there will be no problem for Turkish attitudes and its approach to Armenia.

**MR. MACDOUGALL:**

I think you were fair to say that we all recognize the painful issue of the history between Armenia and Turkey some 100 years and more ago. We recognize that. We understand it looks very different from either side of the border. Though I have studied this for years, I find that it is an open question. I don't want to go into that here, except that I will offer you a brief chance to comment. And then I would like to move on. Perhaps we'll go back to your questions, but try and move past these historical issues.

I appreciate the comments on both sides of this issue, and I would like to underscore the fact that it is important within a group of this type that you are both here and that you are able to exchange views. I hope you can speak privately to each other and are able to take some small step forward or reach an understanding of the way forward because, again, the frozen conflicts in the region, I believe, are an impediment to a better future for everyone in the region, though I don't minimize the difficulties and the challenges in trying to solve them. I applaud both of you for your views and for your restraint.

**CAPT HASAN:**

Mr. Celac suggested interaction, further interaction, much more interaction between Black Sea Four, Black Sea Operation Harmony, and the EU’s Coast Guard initiatives. Could you please elaborate on this point and the modalities of the initiative?
AMBASSADOR CELAC:

By the end of this year, the European Commission is expected to submit to the EU Council and to the European Parliament, a comprehensive maritime policy covering two oceans and five seas that wash the littoral of European Union countries. The Black Sea is one of the five. The new European maritime policy, which has been in the making for the past three years and is still being elaborated on, covers a very wide range of issues from ecological to fisheries to the geological changes of the coastline, to safety and reliability of navigation, to accidents, to support in case of accidents at sea, and also security at sea. A very comprehensive document is still being developed.

One of the provisions of that communication, which for the European Union will probably acquire legal force, is about the European Coast Guard Service, which is already being experimentally applied between individual European countries sharing the same littoral. Basically, it refers to mutual exchange of Coast Guard vessels in each other’s territorial water.

I raise this issue for reflection because of the obligations of the new members, Bulgaria and Romania, under this future document, which will include the commitment to Coast Guard Service. Therefore, it will be useful for Turkey, as a future member of the European Union, to think it over and to see whether there are incompatibilities. I don’t think there are. I think that it does not affect the Montreux regime in any way. And I think there is compatibility and room for cooperation between the concept of a European Coast Guard Service and existing agreed-upon operations, Black Sea Four and Operation Harmony, agreed to by the six littoral states. I know how sensitive the Montreux issue is. And I sympathize with the Turkish position on that.

MR. MACDOUGALL:

As I have said, the value of meeting here is to understand better how each side feels, what issues each side feels are important, and to actually explore ways that we could work together to try and promote some common interests.
LTG Maples presents an official gift to the representatives from the Republic of Georgia, CPT Irakli Kurasbediani and COL Gochia Ratiani, and thanks them for offering to host the next Black Sea/Caspian Sea Symposium in Batumi, Georgia in June 2008.
AFTERNOON SESSION

Energy and Security Energy
Transport Issues in the Black Sea
and Caspian Sea Region

BG SAVU:

General Medar will be the moderator of the discussions. I am very confident that, once again, he and his esteemed guests will present new perspectives on the topics of this panel, which are energy and the security of the energy transport in the Black Sea — Caspian Sea region. Ambassador Larry Napper of the United States, Brigadier General Vahtahg Kapanadze, sorry for my pronunciation, sir, from Georgia, and Mr. Robert Lee Ayers from the United Kingdom will deal with this issue.

GEN SERGIU MEDAR:

I think that isolation, for our countries and for us, is the most dangerous thing. What we have to do is extend the dialogue, to talk, to express our opinions, and to understand each other’s cultures and to understand each other’s interests.

Today’s world is not a world of ideologies anymore, not a world of black and white, but a world of interests, and we have to identify all of our countries’ interests. It doesn’t matter that one country is big and another small. Every country has the right to have its national interests and to do everything to achieve its national interests. And we are here to try to identify all our national interests and to put them together for the common interest, which is very simply called peace.

The subject for this afternoon is energy and the security of energy transport in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea. We are here as chiefs and representatives of military intelligence. The first question should be why does military intelligence need to discuss energy? Why not a representative of the energy companies to discuss prices, the amount of energy in the reserves, transportation, or the capability of transportation, and so on?

But we are here as representatives of our intelligence services because the area of energy is always a subject of security. These areas were always troubled areas. Why? Because of the crossing interests in that area of energy.
Then why military intelligence? Militaries generally deal with, let's say, conflict areas with military things, with brigades, divisions, and so on. When I speak about J-2, everybody thinks this is about combat intelligence. But in our day, commanders cannot be isolated in a battlefield from the political issues that happen in the battlefield. This is why we can never separate military intelligence and security issues.

Why is energy a security issue? It has always proved to be so, even by history. It's a security issue from the national point of view because the lack of energy affects national security. But it is a security issue from the international point of view because of the tendency for every country to position itself in a very advantageous way regarding areas of energy resources.

This was underlined very clearly by the final statement from a NATO summit from Riga when energy and the security of energy were discussed. This means that NATO is moving a little bit from a political military alliance to a security alliance. It doesn't deal so much with military issues and political issues as it will with security issues in the future. This is on one side.

On the other side, everybody is thinking about NATO enlargement, European Union enlargement, and bringing in some of these countries. Is this an offensive process or not? This is the question for some people.

But when we are looking for NATO enlargement, when we are looking for European Union enlargement, we don't have to see this as an alliance enlargement. It's a process of democracy enlargement. Not guns, not tanks, but democracy issues.

This is coming now from West to East, but also from East to West. This is why we have to think and why we have to see this as a democracy enlargement.

The speech by President Putin in Munich, for me, honestly, was not a surprise, because everything he said had been said before, on different occasions by different people. But one of the things that I would like to underline from his speech is that he said that the energy market in Russia is an open market. He said that there are 26 or 28 Western European and American companies involved in energy and transportation resources. As long as the energy market and the transportation lines are open, it means that the Black Sea is an open sea.

The question from the security point of view was whether the Black Sea was an open sea or not? President Putin gave the answer. It's an open sea as long as the market is open to the world. This raises another question in the way he saw it.

You know that in intelligence, it is very difficult to draw the line between analysis and speculations. For this reason, nobody can say that from here up to here, it's analysis, and from here up to here it's speculation.
My question for you, and maybe in your comments you can talk about this, concerns what I said about the energy market being an open market. Pipelines are an open market and, as a conclusion, the Black Sea is an open sea. In your comments, say whether this is analysis or speculation.

I would like to underline something else. For the people who are studying energy, the Hubert Curve is very well known. The Hubert Curve shows how much energy production and consumption are increasing over time and when they will start to decline. The Hubert Curve shows that sometime around 2020 we will reach the maximum of exportation and energy resources. In 2030, these will start to decline. It is not necessary for energy resources to be finished; all the studies show that when an additional 15 percent of the energy is used, a lot of countries will be close to collapse.

This is another subject that I would like to bring to the table. Is it true that countries would like to position themselves regarding energy resources, and that between 2020 and 2030, countries that are better positioned on the energy map of the world will try to take advantage of this? After 2030 we'll see what will happen.

I would like to present Ambassador Larry Napper, who worked as a foreign service officer in Russia, in Moscow, in Botswana. He was ambassador ad interim indicium in Bucharest, Romania, ambassador in Latvia and ambassador in Kazakhstan. And now he is a senior lecturer at the Bush School of Government at Texas A&M University.

The other member of the panel is somebody with roots in the area that we are discussing. People from outside the area, intelligence people, always know what is happening in that area. But people with roots in the area feel what is happening in their area. In intelligence, there is a huge difference between knowing and feeling. And this is the great value that you bring.

This is Brigadier General Kapanadze, who was Chief of the General Staff of Georgia, who graduated from Tbilisi State University, the Military Academy in Kiev, Ukraine, and the George Marshall Center in Germany. He will present some ideas about energy issues in the area, and again, with roots in the area.

Finally, we have Bob Ayers, who has worked all his life in intelligence, military intelligence, the Defense Intelligence Service, and now he continues to work on security and intelligence issues in the private sector.

AMBASSADOR LARRY NAPPER:

A few of us here can remember that some 25 years ago the Atlantic Alliance was in the middle of a dispute over construction of the 3,500 mile Druzhba gas pipeline from Western Siberia to seven countries of Western Europe. The stakes in that dispute between the U.S. and its closest West Euro-
pean allies, while deeply rooted in the Cold War, are distinctly reflected in the Black Sea—Caspian Sea Agenda of the 21st century, because some of the questions that were asked then are being asked again now.

To what extent would Europe’s increasing dependence on energy supplies controlled by the Kremlin affect European decision-making on broader East-West political issues? Would Moscow be a reliable supplier of energy for European and global markets, or would it use the leverage inherent in its energy supply status for political gain? Would the efforts of the United States to use extraterritorial reach of economic sanctions against adversary regimes elicit support or resistance from the European, Black Sea, and Caspian Sea partners?

With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, most of the crises of the 1980s, including the nuclear weapons and arms control disputes of that period, have passed into history. But the issues created by the gas and oil pipeline dispute in 1982 are as fresh as today’s headlines and still require the spirit of consultation, coordination, and compromise that eventually led to the solution of the 1982 dispute over the construction of the Druzhba pipeline.

We all know that for two years in a row, disputes between Russia and its neighbors, Ukraine and Belarus, have threatened to cut off Russian energy supplies to Europe. The stakes for European consumers and for transatlantic relations, and I would argue for relations among this American-Black Sea-Caspian Sea community, could not be higher. Europe has no short-term alternative to Russian energy supplies, which provide 40 percent of the gas and 25 percent of the oil consumed by the European Union.

Critical Russian interests are also at stake, since Russia is now the world’s largest exporter of natural gas and the second largest exporter of oil, behind Saudi Arabia. Energy exports have driven the economic rebound that is the principal achievement and the principal potential legacy of Vladimir Putin’s presidency.

While not directly dependent on Russian energy exports, the United States has a vital interest in global energy security, which, for the foreseeable future, cannot be assured without Russia’s cooperative participation in international energy markets.

Europe, Russia, the United States, and all the countries of the Black and Caspian Sea region have critical interests in the peace and stability of the border regions of Central Europe, the Black Sea, and the Caspian, where NATO, the European Union, and the independent states of the former Soviet Union meet. Given their different degrees of dependency on Russian energy, it is predictable that the United States and the European Union have reacted
differently to the disputes that have disturbed Russia’s energy relationships with Ukraine and Belarus and threatened Russian energy exports to Europe.

In a famously reported speech on May 2, 2006 in Vilnius, Vice President Cheney articulated the Bush Administration’s critical assessment of Russian actions. I quote, “No legitimate interest is served when oil and gas become tools of intimidation or blackmail, either by supply manipulation or attempts to monopolize transportation. And no one can justify actions that undermine the territorial integrity of a neighbor or interfere with democratic movements.”

By contrast, during the threatened cutoff of Russian oil exports through Belarus, German Chancellor Merkel, whose country holds the rotating presidency of the European Union, called for consultations with Russia and Belarus. The lack of such consultations, and here I quote, “destroys confidence and this is no basis for smoothly building up a constructive relationship.” This was what Merkel told a January 9, 2007 press conference in Berlin.

For its part, the Kremlin has blamed supply disruptions on Ukraine and Belarus and deflected all efforts by the U.S. and the EU, including last summer’s G8 summit in St. Petersburg, to nail down more specific and enforceable Russian commitments to assure deliveries of energy to the European Union.

As this conference considers how best to coordinate a comprehensive approach to Eurasian energy security, I think we ought to begin from the premise that it is unrealistic to expect that Russia will continue indefinitely the Soviet energy subsidies to its neighbors in Ukraine and Belarus. Given their commitment to free energy markets and their lack of leverage over the Kremlin’s decisions on a commodity of key economic importance to Russia, the European Union and the United States simply are not in a position to protect Ukraine and Belarus from an eventual rise in Russian energy prices to world market levels, even if they were inclined to do so. Rather, Europe and the United States must realistically focus on promoting arrangements that allow transit countries such as Ukraine a fair opportunity to prepare for, and respond to, market prices for Russian energy.

Certainly direct dialogue with the Kremlin and, where necessary, brokering of differences between Russia and the bordering energy transit countries may be essential, as in the January 2006 standoff between Russia and Ukraine. In these circumstances, the European Union is the appropriate party to take the lead, with the U.S. in a supporting role.

It may also make sense for the European Union and the U.S. to work together to provide transit countries such as Ukraine with financial and technical assistance to establish at least limited strategic energy reserves that would increase their capacity to bargain with Russia over transition arrange-
ments for energy pricing and transit. Such strategic oil reserves in Germany and Poland, even if sufficient only for a few weeks, provided those countries with vital breathing space during last winter’s threat of oil supply disruption between Russia and Belarus.

At the strategic level, the U.S. and the European Union need to consider whether the G8, as currently configured, provides a realistic framework for management of their energy dialogue with Russia. Despite the focus of the St. Petersburg G8 summit on energy security, the vaguely worded summit statements have done nothing to resolve the vexing problems that beset the energy relationship between the Kremlin and the West.

In addition to energy transit uncertainties, western firms are finding it increasingly difficult to protect their existing investments in Russia, much less consider new multi-billion dollar projects. For instance, last December, on the eve of the Russia-Belarus energy transit dispute, Royal Dutch Shell, along with Japanese partners Mitsui and Mitsubishi, under unrelenting pressure from Russian regulators, sold a majority stake in the huge Sakhalin II oil and gas project to Gazprom. Sakhalin II had been the only large energy operation left in Russia that did not involve a Russian firm and one of a handful of such projects still allowed to operate under 1990’s era production sharing agreements that give investors some protection from the uncertainties of the Russian political and legal systems.

Shell’s capitulation at Sakhalin II raises further questions about the future of other major western energy investments, including TNKBP, the largest joint venture involving a major western oil company, British Petroleum. Confronted by huge bills for alleged back taxes, the future of TNKBP and the British Petroleum stake in Russia may well depend on future Kremlin decisions.

In the wake of the Sakhalin II affair, the noted British publication, *The Economist*, commented that, “If Russia continues on this course, and especially if Mr. Putin meddles with the constitution to grab a third term, it does not deserve to stay in the G8.” At least two American presidential candidates, John McCain on the Republican side and John Edwards on the Democratic side, have been sharply critical of Russia’s role in the G8. Other influential voices in the United States and Europe have called for expansion of the G8 by the addition of rising economic competitors and energy consumers, such as China and India.

With the inauguration of a new French president, a looming transition at 10 Downing Street, the U.S. presidential campaign already well underway, and President Putin considering his options in 2008, no fundamental decisions are likely on the configuration of the G8 or its capacity to manage East-West energy relationships over the next couple of years. But neither
should we expect that the periodic Bush—Putin summits or Putin’s summits with European Union leaders will be more successful than they have been up to now in managing energy relationships with Russia.

There may well be no silver bullet to replace the frustrating process of working out energy relationships with Russia on a case-by-case basis with the potential for periodic flare-ups such as the transit standoffs of the past two winters. The opportunities and challenges inherent in western energy relationships with Russia underscore the need for a coordinated approach to broader political developments in the Black and Caspian Sea regions.

The December 21, 2006 death of Turkmenistan’s long reigning leader President Niyazov is a reminder that leadership succession remains a serious challenge to stability throughout the energy rich countries of the Caspian littoral and Central Asia. As in Ukraine and Belarus, Gazprom and other Kremlin-controlled companies have been maneuvering to achieve a dominant position in the production and transport of gas in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and to compete vigorously with major international companies for the energy exports of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.

The U.S. has countered by courting Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev with a vice presidential visit in May 2006 and a subsequent invitation to Washington, including Nazarbayev’s first Oval Office meeting with President Bush since December 2001. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan and China have expanded their energy relationships with a new pipeline for export of Caspian crude to China. Both the U.S. and Russia insist that they have no interest in a new “great game” for geopolitical influence in Central Asia. But the stakes are such that Washington and Moscow, as well as Beijing, may nonetheless find themselves drawn to the playing field.

If the stakes are high in the Caspian and Central Asia, they are even higher in Ukraine, where, since last summer, President Viktor Yushchenko and his Orange Coalition, having failed to win parliamentary elections in March 2006, accepted the appointment of Viktor Yanukovych as Prime Minister. While ostensibly retaining long-term goals of membership in NATO and the EU, Yanukovych made it clear during visits to Washington and Brussels last fall, that his government has other near-term priorities.

NATO’s November summit in Riga passed without serious discussion of a Membership Action Plan for Ukraine. The EU, having just absorbed Bulgaria and Romania on January 1st, is probably even farther away than NATO from a meaningful membership track for Ukraine. The duration and eventual outcome of cohabitation between Yushchenko and Yanukovych is uncertain, especially with new parliamentary elections looming. It does seem clear that future prospects for democratic and market reform in Ukraine will require a clear transatlantic commitment to closer partnership with Ukraine.
In the 1990’s the focus was on military security, and NATO’s Partnership for Peace symbolized a Western vocation for Ukraine. In the 21st century, the U.S. and Europe ought to offer a close partnership in energy as a means of assuring Ukraine a meaningful path toward closer integration with Europe and greater stability in the Caspian and Black Sea regions.

I want to close very shortly, but before doing that, I want to mention some interesting work at the George Bush School at Texas A&M concerning the impact of global climate change on the region we have been discussing here, the Black Sea and Caspian region and Eurasia. The researchers came out with two interesting conclusions.

One is that climate change, especially if it continues to accelerate, will lead to a number of states who are already on the edge of state failure being pushed over the brink. In other words, the number of governments in the world who could be judged as in a crisis of state failure is likely to increase as the phenomenon of global warming deepens and becomes more serious.

Given the commitments of many of the countries in this room to global peacekeeping efforts, to maintaining peace and stability in regions of the world that are likely to be greatly affected by global climate change, this is a matter that our militaries and our intelligence services ought to be carefully considering.

The other interesting thought that this group of researchers came up with, or the question that they asked themselves, is what will be the likely change in the relationship among the so-called great powers of the world, those that, for want of a better grouping, those within the G8, plus China and India, that will be brought about by the acceleration of global climate change?

One of the thoughts that occurred to this group of researchers is that the one potential winner among the great powers out of a scenario of increasing global warming, could well be the Russian Federation. Because, as global temperatures rise, Russia’s current environmental or climate disadvantage, vis-a-vis the other great powers, that is the fact that its northern latitude makes it very difficult to extract its mineral resources from many areas in Siberia, making agriculture difficult in many parts of the country, may gradually, and perhaps in an accelerating way, disappear. That is, that disadvantage may disappear and this could actually be a benefit for Russia as it tries to make a rebound to great power status in the world.

I think this would be an interesting issue for the group to consider. What are the implications of global climate change for the future of the Black Sea and Caspian Sea region, for your vocation or the vocation of your militaries and commitment of your militaries to global peace-keeping, and for the configuration of global great power relationships with which your countries
must contend? If one of the features of intelligence is that you should be looking over the horizon at emerging threats as well as at the threats that are already at the threshold, then I think serious consideration of the implications of global climate change might well be an interesting topic for a future agenda of this group.

BG VAHTAHG KAPANADZE:

From the very first years of the new century, energy-related issues, particularly those of energy production, distribution and security, gained an unprecedented importance, becoming arguably the hot-button topic of today’s political and economic discourse. Indeed, energy security is a precondition for economic stability and an indivisible part of a state’s overall security. Within this framework, partnerships between energy producers and consumer countries enhanced the dialogue about increasing energy interdependence, security of supply, and demand issues.

Georgia’s approach to energy security resides on the perception that energy security issues should be regarded through the prism of four levels of interest. First, the balance of interests of all energy producers. This means that the interests of all players in the energy game have to be considered properly and equally, and all players must adhere to the rules of game.

Second, consumers of energy resources have to rid themselves of political pressure from producer countries. Third, it is necessary to reach an acceptable balance of interests between the consumers and producers. In other words, the demands of consumers have to be met by suppliers, and vice-versa. Fourth, diversification of supply sources and routes of transportation is one of the key elements in the energy game.

Growing demand for energy resources means that future energy security in Eurasia very much depends on diversifying the sources of energy supplies and on enhancing the security of the energy network. Eurasia, comprising all of Europe, Russia, the Caspian region, Central Asia, and South and Northeast Asia, represents a natural cooperative space for energy supplies. There is a real possibility, in our view, to establish in the future an efficient, transparent, and competitive environment for investment and trade in energy extending across the entire Eurasian continent.

Georgia carefully monitors developments in world energy markets, as they are vital for my country’s security and economic well-being. Naturally, our particular attention focuses on the steps taken by our neighbors. Much to our concern, we witness how the Russian Federation has been spending considerable effort and resources to establish itself as a monopolistic supplier of energy to the EU. The Russian government does not hesitate to assault investment projects implemented by foreign companies, Sakhalin II being a
recent example, which has resulted in the redistribution of shares in favor of the state-owned company Gazprom. Recent months show the determination with which Moscow has tried to become the sole distributor of the vast Caspian oil and gas reserves.

There has been considerable evidence of Russia’s wielding energy clout for achieving political goals, that is, cases of energy supply interruption, compounded by sharp increases in the price of natural gas. For example, in Georgia, two price hikes resulting in a near five-fold increase of the price, from $50 to $235, demonstrated all too clearly the importance of having a reliable trade partner, which can be achieved only if the genuine diversification of supplies is in place. Cooperation in the field of energy security has a vital role for ensuring sustainable economic development, and the stability and security of our nations.

Georgia’s energy security is one of the top priorities of the government’s policy. This year, we have already started receiving natural gas from two countries. To a certain extent, this already guarantees our energy security, but we view it as only the first step. Further, strengthening of Georgia’s energy security will require the active participation of our country in regional and global energy dialogues.

For hydrocarbon-deficient Georgia, domestic efforts are inadequate. Over the last few years, Georgia’s policy in the energy sector is reflected in our participation in the following major international projects.

They are the Baku-Tbilisi-Supsa oil pipeline, whose capacity is six million barrels a year and which started its operation in 1999; the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, with a capacity of one million barrels a day, and which was launched in July of 2006; South Caucasus pipeline, connecting Shah-Deniz fields of Azerbaijan with Erzurum in Turkey via Georgia, started operating recently, in January of 2007. This pipeline will deliver six billion cubic meters of gas to Turkey per year under an existing gas purchase agreement. Certain volumes will be delivered to Azerbaijan and Georgia, thus contributing to the energy security of these countries. The initial capacity of the gas pipeline will be 8.4 billion cubic meters per year, with throughput capacity to be increased up to 30 billion cubic meters per annum and the potential of being connected to European gas markets.

Georgia has been actively pursuing policies taking effective advantage of its strategic location and transit potential. The key feature of strong energy security in a region is a balance between the provider, consumer, and transit countries on the basis of equality and competitiveness. In this connection, in the face of Russia’s growing aggressiveness and its moves expressly aimed at becoming Europe’s sole non-OPEC oil and major gas provider, there should be intensification of a dialogue to support the development of new
roads for the transportation of energy resources from Central Asia and the Caspian Sea.

Along these lines, with the South Caucasus Pipeline already in operation, successful realization of the Nabucco Project is of crucial significance in terms of boosting the energy security of EU member states and curbing Moscow’s influence over Europe.

The construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Supsa and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipelines, as well as the South Caucasus natural gas pipeline, contributed to the increased energy security of all participant countries. These transit routes signified an important alternative avenue for providing world energy markets with Caspian basin energy. These projects have also established Georgia as a reliable partner in the transportation of energy.

Needless to say, the pipelines have also had intangible political significance for the Caucasus. Along with the obvious and direct contribution to Georgia’s energy and economic security, which is particularly pronounced in the case of the South Caucasus Pipeline, the projects played a major role in attracting large investment and raising the country’s GDP.

Of course, the construction of new routes of transportation of energy carriers require increased security guarantees. There are several factors to be taken into account, including the protection of the environment during the construction and exploitation of the pipeline systems, securing the pipeline systems against damage, and political stability in the transit countries.

Of course, the unresolved internal conflicts in the Tskhinvali region and in Abkhazia do create a certain risk for the secure shipment of energy. The rest of the countries want a stable South Caucasus region for investment in the energy sector as well as for the geostrategic interests of the region.

To counter this development, one of Russia’s tactics is to slow down western advances by keeping the so-called “frozen conflicts” active. This makes it harder for Georgia to attract western investment, and it is complicating its association with NATO.

Government, oil companies, and pipeline operators are seeking to put in place mechanisms to reduce the impact of possible disruptions. The most effective way to address this kind of sabotage is to confront terrorists wherever they are. This is already being done by most countries as part of the Global War on Terror. And this is one of the reasons why Georgia actively participates in the multinational operations.

In order to ensure Euro-Atlantic energy security, new routes for the transportation of energy must be developed. On May 11 and 12, 2007, a summit of leaders of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Lithuania, and Poland took place in Krakow, Poland. The principal outcome of this meeting was the deci-
sion to look for other ways of transportation of Caspian energy, especially the vast reserves of Central Asia to European markets.

One of the possible routes is to construct a Trans-Caspian pipeline, and to supply oil and gas through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Black Sea to Ukraine, Poland and the EU. According to the agreement reached during this meeting, a joint company will be created that will be under the control of the participating countries.

But the text of the Krakow declaration should not create the illusion that the realization of this vision is around the corner. All of you will undoubtedly know that parallel to this event there was another summit, rightfully named in international media as a “rival energy summit,” held in two shifts, in Astana and Ashgabat. The summit resulted in specific decisions to direct Kazakhstan’s growing oil and gas output to Russia, thus threatening the prospects of trans-Caspian westbound exports. If the latter project comes to fruition, the significance of the Krakow summit might turn out to be very limited.

All in all, this should be another potent signal to the international community, and first and foremost for Europe, that the time for a unified approach towards energy is long overdue and that a concerted and well-planned strategy should be elaborated and implemented without further delay.

We understand that no nation can save its security and development alone. Georgia today belongs to Europe and to the system of Euro-Atlantic institutions and shares the same values, visions and aspirations. Together with the whole international community, we confront common challenges as well as new and dangerous security threats. Working together with a combined strategy and resources is the only way that we can bring ourselves closer to achieving shared security and advancement and to meeting the challenges of the 21st century.

For our part, Georgia reaffirms, once again, its commitment to cooperation in the energy field. Open, transparent, efficient, and competitive energy markets are the cornerstone of a common strategy, and only adherence to these principles will bring about the enhancement of energy security in the entire Eurasian space.

**MR. ROBERT AYERS:**

What I thought I would do today is change the theme a little bit. We have heard many speakers address the topic of collaboration. We have heard people address historical trends and themes. I would like to distill all of this down to a specific problem, and perhaps I can use this problem to illustrate what, from my perspective, represents some challenges for all of you.
The problem I chose was the Baku-Tbilisi to Ceyhan pipeline that was opened a couple of years ago. And what I thought I would do is examine that and see how I would go about disrupting the system if I were a terrorist.

The first thing I did was decompose the system into what I assumed to be logical component parts. There is no magic behind this. I am not, by nature, a petrochemical engineer or system designer. I am acting, in this capacity, as a terrorist.
For the extraction components of the system, I was able to identify where in the Caspian the offshore platforms were, which ones were functioning, and which ones weren’t. You can find those on navigational maps and the internet if you care to look.

Preparation—this is a picture of the headquarters and central site in Baku that represents the simple pumping station and the command and control unit for the pipeline itself. The picture on the left is a picture taken outside the walls. It looks very secure, very difficult to penetrate. The picture on the
right is an overhead picture available on Google Earth. It shows the central facility under construction, but it gives you an idea of the internal composition and layout of the central facility.

Transportation—this is very easy. The pipeline components are clearly seen on many pictures on the internet, as are the actual pumps that are used in the pumping facilities. And the maker of the pumps, with great pride, claims how well they work and how pleased he was to be able to install them along this pipeline. That's an important point that we will come back to later.

At the far end of the pipeline in the Turkey terminus, there are storage facilities. Here is a picture of one of the storage facilities, where the POL is stored until it can be transshipped. Also associated with the remote end
is a refinery. This is a picture of the refinery. I can give you the geographic coordinates of the picture, if I want, but in the interest of time, you will have to take my word for that.

And the distribution system—here are pictures of two quays in Turkey in the Ceyhan region, one a single quay, the other a dual quay. The map on the bottom left describes the system above it. This is a satellite picture on the upper right and an oblique picture taken from on the ground, also of the Ceyhan facility.

So very quickly, I was able to identify all of the critical components of the system, their location, their configuration, and sufficient information about them to make an attack seem like a viable idea.

If I were a terrorist, when I attack this system what I would try to do is maximize disruption to the entire system. I would also like to attack it in such a way as to have the longest recovery time possible. Because I am a terrorist, I want to maximize the propaganda value from my attacks.

So, going back through the system one step at a time. The extraction components, if you will, the offshore drilling stations, how do you attack those? Fairly simple, by boat. There are some problems with attacking them in that there are a sufficient number of them, so that knocking out one or two, although it would degrade the system, wouldn’t bring it to a halt.

So in order to maximize disruption to the system by attacking the extraction components, you would have to have multiple, simultaneous, coor-
ordinated attacks. You would have a fairly long recovery period, but it would be a very complex operational attack to launch.

At the Baku headquarter site, you have one point of failure for the entire system. Because the system itself uses computers, it is subject to logical attack. Several people spoke earlier about the Estonia attacks.

I would simply point out to you that similar attacks have taken place between China and Taiwan for the last ten years and, if anyone would like to talk about defensive information warfare, see me after this presentation. I am the former Director of the U.S. Department of Defense Defensive Information Warfare Program.
So, this is a good attack. This is a good target. It can achieve maximum operational impact and maximum propaganda value.

The transportation component, this is fairly easy to attack because it is very widespread geographically. But simply attacking the pipeline itself doesn't do that much damage. It can be easily repaired and put back in service. So if I was to attack the transportation system, I would attack the pumping...
stations. And because I know who makes the pumps, I would also attack the manufacturing plant that makes the pumps to ensure that no replacements were available.

The storage facility is an easy target; a big soft target susceptible to ground attack, mortars, people on the ground putting charges against the tanks themselves, extremely easy target.

Refining, this is a bonus target because it is not primarily a part of the system itself. It’s an ancillary part, also a soft target easily engaged.

The distribution system, where the oil leaves the system and is put onboard tankers for transshipment, is also a relatively easy target. But you don’t attack the quay. You wait until there are at least two tankers filling up at the quay, and you attack the tankers, and you sink them at the quay, and you tie up that end of the system for an extremely long period of time, until you can clear the oil and raise the tankers and move them away from the quay.

If I had to prioritize the attacks, speaking as a terrorist, I would go after the Baku headquarters, and I would go after the distribution system, the first one because it is a critical single point of failure and the other because it is very easy access.

Secondary targets I would pursue as possible.

Now, speaking as a terrorist, when I look at the system, what I see is this. I see the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is widespread and it is easily physically accessible. Significant disruption is possible, and the operational cost to interdict this distribution system is very low. We’re talking about the

BTC Attack Objectives
System Components

- Transportation
  - Attack by ground easy
  - Pipeline itself is easily repairable so,
  - Attack multiple pumping stations simultaneously
  - Attack pumping stocks or factories
equivalent of small arms. We are talking about organized terrorists equipped with explosives and small arms.

Okay, defense analysis. Now I am going to shift gears. As a defender of this system, there are several things that I conclude through a fairly brief examination of it. The first conclusion is that trying to defend this system at the point of attack, at the point of delivery, is impossible. If the terrorist gets that close, he will succeed in his attack. So you can’t defeat him at the point of delivery. And the only thing that we would be able to do is to defeat him through the combined efforts of the intelligence-led organizations that are concerned with the security of this pipeline system.

Now, I don’t put these slides up to teach people in the intelligence business how to do their job. I put these slides up to make a point that I will come to in another slide or two and that is that when we are talking about the critical infrastructure, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, this

BTC Attack Objectives
System Components

- Storage
  - Attack by ground
  - Easy target
  - Simultaneous attacks on storage tanks
  - Significant disruption

BTC Attack Objectives
System Component

- Refining
  - Attack by ground
  - Easy target
  - Localised disruption
infrastructure is not owned by the state. It’s owned by the private sector. And the private sector is responsible, in many cases, not only for the final line of defense. In some cases, they are the first line of defense for that infrastructure. Not only that, but the private sector, in order to defend its assets, relies on its own surveillance, information collection technology. It also relies in many

## BTC System Components

- Distribution
  - Easy access
  - Target ships at quay
  - Deny berthing to other tankers
  - Significant impact

## BTC Attack Prioritization

- Primary targets
  - Preparation
    - Baku Facility
  - Transportation
    - Two or more pumping stations
cases on private intelligence analysis provided by companies such as Aegis or control risk groups based in London. This is another example of the intelligence collection capabilities that have counterparts in the private sector.

I’d like to make several points.

First of all, when we’re talking about international terrorism, and we’re talking about international energy distribution systems, the problem requires international collaboration to solve it. It can’t be solved by any nation state alone. The United States may be the world’s only surviving superpower,
but acting alone, it cannot deal with this sort of a problem. Because of the nature of attacks on energy distribution systems, there is no classical buildup phase required, like in a conventional military operation. So the indications and warning period between the detection of an attack and the execution of attack are going to be very small, which means that information sharing needs to be real time. Not only do the mechanisms have to be in place for information sharing. They have to be constantly and consistently used. Getting together in a symposium or a meeting to discuss an operational problem provides no solution to that operational problem.

Because we are dealing with portions of infrastructure that is owned by the private sector, the gathering, collating, analyzing and disseminating of information about threats to this infrastructure are problems in which the intelligence agencies, the police, military security agencies, and the civil sector, the civilian owner-operators of these infrastructures, all must work

### BTC Defence Analysis
- Preventing attack at point of delivery extremely difficult of not impossible
- Intelligence lead prevention is only viable solution

### BTC Indications and Warning
**Intelligence EEI**

- **HUMINT**
  - Strangers or known suspects in area (Locals)
  - Cell penetration (Controlled assets)
  - Terrorist network link analysis (Analysis)

- **SIGINT (COMINT)**
  - Internet and telephony used for:
    - Planning Phase
    - Mission Preparation Phase
      - Coordination of movement of weapons, explosives etc)
    - Mission Execution Phase
      - Movements and positioning of attack force
I have heard all of you speak today about the desires and the needs to collaborate on a government-to-government basis. I heard no one speak about the need to involve the owners of the very thing you are trying to protect in your information dialogue.

Lastly, as an old intelligence officer myself, I think for intelligence to have value, especially if we are providing it to people who have to do something with that information, it has to be actionable. Intelligence information that says an unknown person in an unknown location was discussing an attack on an unknown facility, that's not actionable, and it is of little use to the people who are trying to protect this infrastructure.

### BTC Indications and Warning

**Intelligence EEI**

- **PHOTINT**
  - Thermal IR
    - Heat sources (People, fires or vehicles in Area)
    - Imagery
    - People, vehicles, tents in area
    - Imaging Radar
    - Vehicles in area
- **Other (Unattended Ground Sensors)**
  - Acoustic (Vehicles, speech)
  - Seismic (Movements)
  - Other UGS

### Intelligence

**Concept of Operation**

- Trans-national problem requires international intelligence collaboration
- Minimal warning time necessitates real time information sharing and analysis
- Intelligence elements, policies, military and private sector must work together
- Intelligence provided to reaction forces must be near time and actionable
I have many titles. One of them is that I am an Associate Fellow at Chatham House, which is a think tank in London. If you didn't like my presentation and if I offended you, then I am an Associate Fellow at Chatham House. I am an academic. If you liked my presentation and it caused you to think, then I am a businessman working for the Italian Defence contractor Finmeccanica.

**GEN MEDAR:**

Thank you Bob, and thank God, you are on our side, and you are not on Osama Bin Laden's side with these kinds of ideas. But this is giving us, of course, ideas on how to defend ourselves. Because you know very well that one of the principles of intelligence and counterintelligence work is to try to walk in the shoes of your adversary and to identify the ways to defend yourself.

**BG SAVU:**

The discussions that we already started here are another proof of how important transparency and cooperation are between our countries because we have to help each other and try to find solutions together with our friends.

**PARTICIPANT:**

Not a comment, but a quick question to Ambassador Napper, if you let me, sir. I would like to have your views on the gas OPEC possibility.

**AMBASSADOR NAPPER:**

This issue has been discussed in a number of forums, but I think it would be difficult to do, as least as regards Eurasian gas. One thing that would make it difficult to do is that OPEC, if you mean by that a cartel, requires at least a few actors to participate in the cartel.

We are now close, at least as far as gas is concerned, to having the equivalent of a one-company, one-country cartel, because Gazprom is very close to achieving an almost unilateral cartel status in much of the Eurasian region, at least as regards gas.

The situation is a little better with regard to oil exports from the Caspian, but the gas situation, to my mind, looks more doubtful. Another reason why a cartel would be difficult to enforce is that there is a large potential for the preparation and export of liquefied natural gas from a number of countries who have gas deposits. And if the stations for liquefying gas, if the container ships necessary to transport it and then the receiving stations in purchasing countries to re-liquefy the gas would be available, I think that would go a long
way toward opening up the international natural gas trade, and would make it very difficult for a cartel in gas to hold its position.

**BG SAVU:**

What I would like to mention is that security of the pipelines and the security of the energy resources are part of a mission for everybody. And not only about oil or gas pipelines, but electric energy lines. All of us have to defend and assure the security of these lines crossing our countries. This is in a peaceful time. I am sure that the countries that are here and other countries will ensure in peace time the security of these lines against terrorist attacks. During wartime, it is another situation, but we hope that everything will be solved by peaceful means.

I would like to make some remarks, thinking that tomorrow's panels will be a continuation of the discussions we started here. One concerns the asymmetrical threats we just discussed here and the possibilities of terrorist attacks, terrorists being only one of the components of asymmetric threats.

Tomorrow's last panel will discuss the bilateral and multilateral cooperation between our countries. And I really would like for this last panel to try to find and make new proposals. Because today we identified possible troubles, possible difficulties in our areas of interest, and the last panel is the one that could give, through cooperation, some potential solutions for the problems that were presented today.

And I would like to ask the Presidency and the Chairmanship of this symposium to offer comments at the end of this day.

**NDIC PRESIDENT A. DENIS CLIFT:**

Thank you very much. Let me very briefly comment on just a few of the threads that I have been seeing in the discussion thus far, and what it seems to me that we may be weaving here. Bob Ayers has just told us about the importance of intelligence for defending an oil pipeline. This morning, our colleague from Georgia told us of the importance of exchange of information to interdicting radioactive materials. Tomorrow, we are going to be discussing the role of intelligence services in improving trust-building mechanisms and regional security. And this morning Ambassador Celac said, “What would you like to see as a positive outcome?” He said if we think positively, the results are more likely to be positive.

What I see emerging here is that this is the way that we should be thinking as we examine the exchanging of information. And I would hope that this would be a discussion that we could continue after we break this formal session and as we continue tomorrow.
MG FRANCISC RADICI:

I don't want to miss the opportunity to say something very important, some short comments about the remarks that General Medar started the panel with about the question of open energy markets. This is a very important issue, and we have to expand a little bit on this issue. It is not a question; it is only some food for thought. Not only is energy a market, energy is a portion of a bigger economic market and we have to think if in this region this is important only for the countries in the region or for others. And the Black Sea, if it is open, or is semi-open, or it is closed, or semi-closed, it is important from the perspective of asymmetrical threats.

So we should think if it is correct, our approach, if the energy is the problem in the region, or if other problems should be discussed and solved. To keep the Black Sea as a closed or a locked sea, or to open it to the collective in order to combat or to face those threats or challenges, it is our decision. My judgment is that everybody around this table will agree that the response to the transnational problems we face must be a transnational approach.

As a member of the Romanian delegation, I would like to ensure you of our willingness to develop coherent actions together with all the actors from the region and with the other actors, the United States, NATO, the EU and so on, in order to face these threats and to solve the problems.

LTG MAPLES:

Because we only have two days to really have this symposium, I would be very interested in your thoughts on today. What did we hear? What was the value of the symposium today? Where do we need to take the symposium tomorrow to make it of benefit to you?

Are there specific outcomes you are looking for that we haven't been able to get to or we are not focused on getting at as a part of this symposium? What do we need to do differently, anything?

And I think all of us, collectively, should endeavor to make sure that that representation is there in the future. It is so important for us to be able to move forward.

As I listened to part of the earlier dialogue, I was thinking from my own perspective of military intelligence and how military intelligence and the other national intelligence organizations, primarily those that deal with internal security matters, and what that relationship is. I was thinking of the fact that we represent our militaries, our armed forces and, therefore, we have a unique place, a unique position in dealing with the security threats that we're talking about it.

And we need to think about it in terms of the armed forces and of the militaries and the role of our armed forces and make sure that, as we look for
those positive outcomes that Mr. Clift talked about, and that we do it in the sense of what we are able to do, what we are able to control.

And I think that gets to your point that when we leave this conference tomorrow, that we have something concrete that we have talked about and that we can move forward with, that we are able to do something with. That we are able to do something with and are not dependent on others.

COL HRISTO KOSTADINOV IVANOV:

I am Colonel Ivanov from Bulgaria. I would like to summarize some main points, the lessons we learned from the lectures here. Of course, there are some challenges and risks in the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, but the level at present is low. Nevertheless, they need some response. Of course we need an immediate response, but it takes preparation in advance to fight or to minimize these risks. I fully agree that we need to improve the means of exchange of information and join the efforts of all the countries. I have in mind, not only the countries of the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, but also the European Union and NATO, because only joint efforts will succeed in victory.

Of course, the most important thing is improving the trust between us. We need, I think, to improve the mechanisms to get information, because the fight with terrorism is like fighting with shadows. Terrorism does not have a face. Sometimes we learn about it only after the facts have already taken place. That is why it is very difficult. We need, in advance, to get information about the threats, not after, just to analyze what happened and how to prevent it in the future.

LTG MAPLES:

Very good points. And thank you, because it is important for us to prevent this threat. I like your comment, in particular, that we don't need the information after it's already happened. Okay, we're looking to prevent these issues and challenges from occurring.
PARTICIPANT:

Thank you sir, I would propose to my Bulgarian colleague to review the national position on participation in Operation Black Sea Harmony, which is a maritime operation in the Black Sea jointly ongoing for three years.

The info exchange mechanisms for Operation Black Sea Harmony consist of an exchange process as well, mentioned in the participation documents of the operation. Currently, Turkey, Russia, our Russian colleague is not here, but they are in the operation, and Ukraine in a few months. We are waiting for their participation. And other countries from the region should think about participation, so that they can be in a position to exchange intelligence on an unclassified or classified basis.

BG SAVU:

Tomorrow we will have the last panel, which will be about cooperation between military intelligence in that area, and I would like tomorrow to give you an answer about Black Sea Harmony, Black Sea Four, what kind of exchanges of information, and exchanges of intelligence we can have. And maybe tomorrow we can define what "Black Sea vulnerabilities" means, what "risks" means, what "threats" means, and what "conflict" means. We all have the tendency to talk about risks and threats together, which all of us know are not the same thing.

And along with the risks and threats, there is information and intelligence we can share and maybe we can make some proposals. And one of the mechanisms already exists in NATO, the BSEC mechanism, which is for NATO countries, but at the same time for PfP countries. But first of all it is necessary to be willing to share. The second is to know what to share, what information and intelligence. And third is to find the mechanisms on how to share.

LTG MAPLES:

And I think that is a great place for us to close today, because that is exactly what we ought to be thinking about tonight, the proposals that we can make, that we can take forward to give us the kinds of outcomes that we are looking for.

So, tomorrow we will have that opportunity. I urge everybody to think about that. Think about the suggestions that have been made here today. And think of others that we might be able to consider collectively tomorrow.
Lcdr Sebastian Ezaru:

Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. The discussions of the first panel of today will be moderated by Dr. Daniel Burghart, United States, a very well known Russian, CIS, and Central European Affairs specialist.

The valuable experience and the impressive career of Dr. Burghart guarantee the successful presentations and discussions of the distinguished speakers accompanying him today: Mr. Serghey Konoplyov, Mr. Iulian Chifu and Mr. Drougos Athanasios.

Dr. Daniel Burghart:

Normally, I would say a few words, however, our first panelist has to literally leave and jump on a plane. They have the car standing by, and he’s been ensured a quick and interesting drive back to Bucharest. Therefore, without any further comments, Serghey.

Mr. Serghey Konoplyov:

We at Harvard have run a Black Sea security program since 2000. In seven years, we have established a pretty impressive network of experts who are active in all the countries represented here, including the Russian Federation, and it’s especially nice to see that they still promote the idea of regional cooperation in the Black Sea. One of the good examples which we must mention is General Gheorghe Savu, one of the organizers of this event, who has been to our program, and since then has risen in rank and responsibility. This event shows how important it is to keep the networks alive and how important it is to bring people together and continue to talk.

Risks, threats, classical risk, classical threats, asymmetric risks. Some of the risks and the threats we already have discussed in the previous two panels. Some of them, we just mentioned. Some of them, we need to go into greater detail.
But if we classify the risks which exist in the wider Black Sea, which includes both seas, Black and the Caspian Sea, there are some old or classic risks, which stem from the mere presence of, say, foreign troops on territories.

There are some threats which exist, but will increase, becoming more dangerous. We'll talk about that. There's smuggling, which happens in the region. These kinds of problems come from the fact that the Black Sea region, or Black Sea, was a natural, actually artificial, barrier between East and West, between NATO and the Warsaw Pact 15 years ago, and the countries which are together in this region, were separated by ideology, by economy, and by many other things.

Fifteen years is not a big lapse of time to patch up all those problems which existed. Even if we're talking about frozen conflicts, which we already discussed — and I would not say just frozen conflicts, but I say foreign troops stationed in other countries' territories. It's not a frozen conflict, but we have a Black Sea fleet, which is stationed in Crimea and nobody knows how that will be solved in 2017, and I know that the General Staff of the Russian Federation has already taken steps. I will be in Kiev in a week's time for meetings. The commander of the Black Sea, later this year, plans to have a regional event on Black Sea security in Sevastopol, and for those who are interested, I could definitely send an invitation. We plan to have visits of regional delegations to both fleets that are stationed in Sevastopol, the Russian fleet, and the Ukrainian fleet.

We need to see what solutions can be found for those kinds of threats. Besides diplomatic actions, there are few potential steps which could be done; if you look at the other countries, say, Great Britain, we can see that there is a similar problem with Northern Ireland, but the Northern Ireland problem is mostly restricted to the boundaries of one country and it's not spilling over into other countries in the region.

At the same time, we have Basque Separatists in Spain for many years, and I don't know if Spain has a solution, but again, that's all within the boundaries of one country and doesn't affect the region. So, there are no common measures there.

As to smuggling and the traffic of illicit materials in the Black Sea, this is a growing problem, and there are some solutions. For instance, we have SECI Center, which is one of the success stories, and which should be promoted and maybe replicated in the Caspian region.

I don't know if the countries which border the Caspian Sea are part of this center or not, at least as observers. I know that the Russian Federation is not part of that, and this is really sad.
Second, there is the international agency of atomic energy, and I think what should be done is to promote implementation in the Black Sea region of the International Atomic Energy Agency, a code of conduct on the safety and security of radioactive sources, and I know that IAEA has a training program that could be used to train countries — to help them physically protect radioactive materials that exist there.

The newest risks and problems appeared with, first, globalization and, second, the position of Russia in the Black Sea.

As to globalization, I will just mention some problems, and I hope that my colleagues will pick up on them. The easiness of moving money from one country to another, laundering money, and using some of it for illicit arms deals is increasing. Yesterday, we were talking about starting to exchange information about money laundering, about banks, and about how we could start working together to stop this illicit electronic crime. This is already one positive result from this conference.

One of the biggest problems we have is the lack of constructive cooperation from the Russian Federation, and we were talking about that yesterday. Jim MacDougall was talking to us about missile defense and how important it is for the US and the Russian Federation's position.

That brings a big problem for Europe and for the Black Sea also, because of the intensity of Russia's position (opposition?) toward this proposal. Countries where those interceptors and radars would be stationed might feel insecure because of a potential Russian response, and that brings us to new risks which may appear.

I will not talk about energy, but you know that Russia learned how to use its vast natural resources very skillfully to exert power in Europe and beyond. Recently, this plot was enhanced by Mr. Putin, sometimes really crudely, but very effectively in Central Asia. You know that he has persuaded Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to send more gas experts through the Russian Federation and to spoil the plans of Americans and Europeans for a Trans-Caspian pipeline, which would bypass Russia.

So, all of this together poses a question of how Russia could be involved in solving the missile crisis and other potential crises in the future. I spoke with several people on the general staff of the Russian Federation two weeks ago, after Jim MacDougall's presentation at Harvard, and I told them, “Listen, the Americans are trying to inform and discuss with you about this missile problem,” and their response was, “Serghey, they would like to come and put a knife in our eye.”

If they want to discuss, they will come and it doesn't matter what they say and it doesn't matter what they do. It just informs us about their intentions, and this is not a technical position. This is not a military position.
This is a political position. I think that this comes from the psychology of the missile stand-off, in Soviet times, and as always with every topic, there is a good joke. So, I will ease some tension here, telling you a joke about a Russian missile and American missile.

These missiles were launched during the Soviet time. The two missiles are going to opposite countries and they meet in the sky. The American missile says, "Listen, I hear so many things about you. Let's talk. Let's look at each other." So, they look at each other and the Russian missile says, "To better understand this, let's drink a little vodka." The American missile says, "Yes, of course." So, they drink a little vodka, and the American missile says, "I am a little lost. I am disoriented." Russian missile says, "Don't worry, just follow me and I'll take you home." So, this is a joke, but sometimes, it shows the seriousness of those countries, of how they stand on particular positions.

But these are the problems. Fortunately, there are some solutions, which are already in use. I mentioned SECI. There is a center of BSIS, of exchange information on the Coast Guard, and we heard yesterday from Ambassador Sergiu Celac that the European Union is working now on a maritime doctrine on the Black Sea, which was a topic of discussion of the European Commission several weeks ago.

So, this is something new, and hopefully it can be enhanced. Turkey's position would be very important because we know that Turkey has two excellent initiatives in the Black Sea, which are working pretty well, and the Russian Federation is working with both of them, for different reasons.

If I may stop here and tell you that when we talk about the threats and the risks in the region, some times we look at them from only one side. We look at them from the side of the West. But if we go to Ankara, or Baku, or Yerevan, or Moscow and say, "What kind of risks and what kind of threats do you see in the Black Sea," sometimes you will get a different picture.

Going back to Russia, Russia has no big risks and no big threats in the Black Sea. Russia has only one threat, the Americanization of this region, bringing more Americans here and bringing more members of NATO. So, when sometimes the United States, when sometimes Russia, let's say, ignores some events on the Black Sea cooperation, it's not because they don't like Romania, Bulgaria or other countries, they don't like the United States and they use those countries as proxies of the United States.

So, now with the European Union becoming more of a player in Black Sea affairs, maybe that tension could be eased a little bit, but this is my personal observation, which I got especially from Russians.

Another initiative which is in the making, and which I think could bring a positive solution to the problem of non-proliferation, and specifically components of weapons of mass destruction, is the new strategy of DTRA,
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency of the United States, on the Black Sea strategy. Those who work with this agency know that it plans to bring countries together at the Marshall Center. We at the Harvard Black Sea Security Program also would be involved in this. We're working closely with EUCOM on that. So, for those who would like to know more about this initiative, please contact our office, and you can get some basic information from us.

Another topic which we didn't touch on in the previous panels, but I think definitely needs more detailed debate is civil emergency preparedness. Why is this? Because the Black Sea countries increasingly find themselves on the border of some volatile and risky environments.

Taking this country, and the ebb and flow which Romania has had to face for the past several years — for example, a year ago there were floods – this is a problem that could not be confined to one country. It's a cross-border problem, and I think this is one of the potential spheres or areas where non-political cooperation could be done, especially with the Russian Federation. I'm a big proponent of bringing the Russians to any initiatives that could give them some opportunity to work together with other countries.

We were talking together with my Greek colleagues today about Greece and the football match that will take place tomorrow, Milano-Liverpool. Probably, many of you will be watching it. This also involves cooperation because disaster could happen at these sporting events, and Greece has an excellent reputation and excellent experience in the protection of the Olympic Games.

In any case, there are problems. There are risks. Some of them are symmetrical. Some of them are very symmetrical, which includes military confrontation. Sometimes it comes from the weakness of several countries and uneven development of the countries.

It's still not clear, at least for me, if the Black Sea countries share all common values and if they understand these common values. Even in listening to some remarks of our distinguished participants here, sometimes we see that national interest comes before transnational interest. That gets translated into policy and how those countries approach risks and threats in the region.

I have an article, which is available in both English and Russian. The organizers have it for those who are interested to learn more about it. For me, this conference was very useful. I have already recruited several people for our events at Harvard, and I hope to continue working, especially with countries such as Romania, because I think it has more Black Sea events per capita than any other countries in the region. This is really good, and I urge other countries to do the same. I will be here again in two weeks, working on non-proliferation issues.
As General Lysenko brought up yesterday, theory is fine. However, there is also a time when we need to identify concrete steps that we can take to answer the problems that we've been discussing.

Talking with my co-chair for the fourth panel, we have set up a "socialist division of labor," for those who still remember what that was. The goal of this panel is to identify, first of all, the asymmetric threats that we face in this region and, second, begin to discuss what it is exactly that we need to address regarding those threats. Then the fourth panel will pick up that discussion and try and come up with concrete steps that we can take, so that we can start to coordinate here and then hopefully, carry them out throughout the next year. The question always becomes, what exactly is an asymmetric threat? Where I teach, we can take up to a semester or more, just trying to define that. We're not going to do that here.

However, for me, an asymmetric threat is a threat that tries to attack your weaknesses, as opposed to your strengths, normally done by an adversary who cannot match you with traditional means and, therefore, has to go to different means, means that you might not normally expect or be prepared to address.

I also would like to broaden the discussion of asymmetric threats to areas that the military might not consider their realm and yet, when you consider that our job is security and the protection of our people and our nation, anything that endangers those people and the nation is a threat. Therefore, in the broader definition of security, this is something that we are responsible for.

Such threats can include crime. We all know what regular crime is, but economic crime that undermines the viability of a nation is also a threat. Health issues, the spread of HIV/AIDS, and drug issues are threats. As an example, the Black Sea and the Central Asian region were cited by the United Nations as being among the areas most at risk for HIV/AIDS in the next 20 to 25 years.

I have been in areas of Central Asia, where local officials told me that up to 40 percent of the youth were using drugs, because these were areas on the major drug trafficking paths, and the youth, with no other employment, were employed as carriers and in turn, paid in drugs. There was nothing to do with these drugs, so they began using them. I would argue that for any society where 40 percent of the youth, the future of any nation, is devastated by the use of drugs, this is a security threat.

Finally, the environment. We all talk about global warming; it was mentioned several times yesterday. But even smaller events, one disaster with a petroleum carrier on the Black Sea, could literally destroy the eco-
system there and all of the economic industries that are tied to the Black Sea. So, I would put forward that all of these are threats that you might want to consider.

We have two more speakers, and then we will open the floor for discussion. I have asked Dave Willis in the back to be a notetaker. If this was a classroom, I would have a great, big board and I would write these down. Instead, I’ve asked him to compile a list of what your concerns are, so that we can address them in the fourth panel.

Thus I would ask you, while the speakers are giving their presentations, that you think about what threats concern you, so that we can bring them up for the group for greater discussion, and maybe between us, we can begin to come up with some answers to the problems that we face.

With that, I’d like to introduce Dr. Athanasios Drougos from Greece.

DR. ATHANASIOS DROUGOS:

Let’s start with two thoughts from yesterday and then I will come directly to the asymmetric issues. First, concerning American and Russian relations, I would like to say that we are moving from strategic partnership to partners on key strategic issues.

Since the beginning of the first Bush Administration and the first meeting with Putin, we’ve had a lot of thoughts and a lot of ideas about strategic cooperation and strategic partnership between the United States, the predominant power in the world, and the Russian Federation.

Taking into consideration the events after the Munich conference last February, I think that we are moving in a different direction with partnerships on specific issues, maybe fighting nuclear terrorism or exchanging information on the role of al Qaeda and other extremist fundamentalist groups.

Maybe things are going fine there, but concerning certain issues, like the future of Kosovo and the Balkans or ballistic missile defense, I think that probably we will have some gaps, and there will be some tensions. These will never reach the level of the Cold War, but there will be tensions with a lot of ramifications, and no one knows where these may lead.

I would say that with or without a yes from the Russians on the Kosovo issue in the Security Council, I think that Kosovo is going toward supervised independence. So, we have to see what the next steps will be and Russian reactions on Kosovo.

Second, I would like to raise the case of missile defense. I wanted to say that, for me, it’s important for the United States to expand the information on this, to influence European public opinion. I’ve recently been to Poland and the Czech Republic, and I’m a supporter of the plan.
But the public in both countries, and in all the other European countries, needs to be better informed. The Kaczynski government, or the Topolansky government in the Czech Republic, knows, but the public needs to be more familiar with the topics because they don’t know them very well.

There are many questions. Why does missile defense not cover Greece, for instance, or our neighbors in France, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and so on?

So, concluding, we are moving to a new style of partnership between the United States and the Russian Federation. Some things are going all right. Some things will increase tensions, and of course, with or without assent by the Russians, concerning Kosovo and missile defense, my personal point of view is that things will proceed normally, but it is very important that public opinion in the European countries be addressed, something that was raised yesterday by James MacDougall. I think that political issues are very important, and the public should be more familiar with them.

Anyway, I’m coming now to the topic of asymmetric threats. As our chairman mentioned, there are some aspects of asymmetric threats that are very interesting. Asymmetric threats, according to my way of thinking, mean attacking the political will of the adversary. We see small groups fighting against the strongest powers on the planet. We have to think a little bit beyond strict military terms when we deal with asymmetric threats. Many people think of David against Goliath.

We have to think about low death against high death. Take the case of the terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are fighting the best army in the world with low style techniques and, to a certain extent, they have created a lot of problems for the Americans and British and other allies in Iraq.

Asymmetric threats are deeply tied to non-state actors, non-state actors against high-tech countries and weapons, non-state actors using suicide bombing and suicide bombers, car bombs, roadside bombs, all those improvised explosive devices, and taking hostages. Also, yesterday it was mentioned that among the asymmetric threats, the recent attacks by hackers from Russia on Estonia, a deeply fragile country because of the strong Russian minority there, and the Russian population existing in some Baltic states. It was difficult for that small country to resist such an attack in cyber-space, using cyber techniques.

Our chairman mentioned, and he was right, that AIDS, HIV, climate change, and environmental problems all have to be taken into account. And it’s very difficult to fight asymmetric threats with traditional means. It’s very difficult to destroy them. So, I think that it’s important to gather all the information about them and to see what we can do with them in the next
years, because I think the 21st century will be a century of dealing with asymmetric threats.

Now to the regional issues in the wider Black Sea region, covering the area from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea. Some of them were mentioned yesterday. Let’s call them social susceptibility. Drug trafficking, terrorist activities, the four frozen conflicts, Transdneister, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Yesterday the very interesting case of proliferation of small arms and light weapons was mentioned. I’m working with that area quite a lot, because the western Balkans, in Kosovo, in the area of the Black Sea and so on, the proliferation of light weapons, I think is one of the main stories.

Some other issues in the Caspian Sea and Black Sea are mass migration, diversification of transit routes, penetration by Islamists, Wahabists, Salafists, both ideas and finance. Our chairman mentioned finance; I would add the case of Islamic finance, penetrating societies by using green money or Islamic money. We have to take care of these. These are real threats for our societies.

Illegal trafficking of human beings is not only in this area but also in the Balkans. There is the illegal spread of armaments to secessionist movements. They feed their movements by transferring small arms and light weapons, and also there are certain weaknesses of laws and corruption in parts of the interior ministries in these countries. The European countries and the United States should work more closely on that area, to support our friends in the Black Sea and Central Asia, to fight corruption and the weakness of laws.

We come now to weapons of mass destruction and materials of mass destruction, that is, proliferation. We can help stop proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction by focusing on uncontrolled borders. Yesterday we heard the Georgian story about this.

In addition to the transferal of materials and weapons of mass destruction as a threat to the Black Sea, I will add another threat: threats coming from the ramifications of the Abdul Khan nuclear supermarket, the guy who built the Pakistani nuclear bomb.

We also have the case of Iran, which I would like to raise to this very prestigious group to have in the future some ideas on intelligence sharing from Pakistan and Afghanistan, two countries which are quite close to Central Asia and the Transcaucuses, and of course, there is a lot of instability. You see what is going on in Afghanistan, where allied forces in Operation Enduring Freedom are fighting terrorists and the remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda.

So, taking into consideration the nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological threats, we have to keep an eye on what al Qaeda is doing. Who
will be the next wave of terrorists, and what kind of weapons will they have ready to attack: biological, chemical, radiological?

I’ll say that we have to think about conventional explosives with some nuclear materials, a “dirty bomb,” especially in difficult areas in the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, because in all these cases we have frozen conflicts and uncontrolled borders and, of course, a lot of other issues.

Also, we have to take into consideration that there are some stockpiles in certain areas, for instance in Transdniester, which are not controlled very well. So, maybe stolen chemical agents could be used for a terrorist incident. I’m afraid that maybe some groups from that area, from the Black Sea and Central Asia, will extend their networks and they will — in the future, conduct operations at a global level.

And of course, there could be suicide bombings with Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons and materials. Turkey is preparing a lot of conferences and papers, and I think that it is doing quite well in that area because there are a lot of problems in the Middle East with suicide bombings. But what will be the next generation of suicide bombers? What will Islamic Jihad or al Qaeda use? Chemical weapons? Biological weapons? Nuclear materials? We have to think about those issues.

Now, I will conclude with a few proposals on how to deal with asymmetric threats in the wider area, the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea region.

In order to give more time for further discussion, because I’m interested in your thoughts and your reactions, I will read some of the proposals slowly in order to facilitate discussion. First, I would like to see a political strategic dialogue introduced in the area from the Adriatic to the Caspian Sea, from the Adriatic to the Black Sea, and from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea and Central Asia.

We have cases like Kosovo. We have independent Montenegro. We have certain developments, maybe, for further stability in Bosnia and Hercegovina. We have Albania, FYROM and Croatia, which will join NATO hopefully next year. President George W. Bush will be in Tirana, Albania, on the 10th of June. So, I would like to see the entire area as an arc, from the Adriatic Sea up to the borders with China because there are a lot of asymmetric issues. We must deal with them, by all means.

The second proposal is that NATO and the European Union should introduce a stability pact, like the stability pact in the Balkans. There are many people, including my country, who criticize a stability pact. They are wrong. A stability pact created a lot of positive trends in the Balkans. It didn’t solve the Kosovo problem, but if it were not for the Kosovo problem, the sta-
bility pact would be a success. It was about stabilization, reconstruction, and dealing with war-torn societies after the end of the wars in the former Yugoslavia. So, it’s important to have a stability pact covering the entire area of the Caspian Sea and Black Sea.

There are a lot of experiences from the inter-Balkan cooperation between Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey, through the southeastern defense ministerial, through the SCEI, through political cooperation (cooperation), the southeastern European political cooperation (same). All these ideas from the Balkan countries, which we have been building over the last years, could be step-by-step transferred to solve problems in the wider areas. So, the Balkan experiences are very useful for further thoughts.

Set up a greater Black Sea defense ministerial, as we have here in the Balkans. We have, as you know, the Southeastern Defense Ministerial. A Black Sea Defense Ministerial will be useful. Of course, I know there are regional and sub-regional problems, but we have to make some new efforts to build confidence in that area.

As you know, in the Baltic States, they have a Baltic Defense College. It’s a very interesting project, with support from the United States, the Scandinavian Congress, Poland, Germany, and so on. In the future, we will build a Black Sea and Caspian Sea Defense College, bringing together offices from all the new countries, bringing their experiences, and having them discuss the threats of the 21st century. They know their areas and they will become more globalized through a Black Sea/Caspian Sea Defense College.

Undertake responsibilities to protect the energy and transport corridors. Yesterday, we had a very interesting presentation here, concerning the Baku-Ceyhan. I would say the same about the Burgas-Andropolis, the new energy corridor.

In Greece and in Bulgaria, with NATO and our American friends, we have to see about how to protect the energy sector in that area, and how to protect the pipelines because terrorists could attack them. We have to take special measures at the Port of Alexandroupolis for the tankers approaching there to take the oil, and for the security of the oil terminals there.

So, it’s important to work together. I appreciate very much the excellent Greek/Bulgarian relations and also the cooperation with America and with NATO. We might consider, and this may be a little bit in the future, building a joint expeditionary Black Sea task force, a task force which would be from all these countries, working together, and sending them together on peace-keeping operations.

Albania, Azerbaijan, Belgium, and Georgia have sent forces to Iraq and to Afghanistan, and they have done excellent work. I follow the three countries and their operations, but I would like to see them in the future
operating jointly and with others in Central Asia. Georgia and Ukraine, and this is my personal point of view, should enter NATO. We very much support Georgia entering NATO after, of course, the three Adriatic states. I think that with both Georgia and Ukraine, we have to build stronger relations.

I read a lot of the strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, a lot of very interesting papers by American and Ukrainian experts. I think that, based on those reports, Ukrainian entry could be accomplished sometime in the future even though I know there are quite a lot of problems.

**Initiate cooperation between the Black Sea forces.** Yesterday, I heard from my friend from Turkey, about all those operations in the Black Sea, and I would like to see cooperation between Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea force. Operation Active Endeavour, as you know, was initiated right after the tragic events of 9/11 in the United States. It's one of the very successful operations in modern time in terms of interdiction.

I've been closely following the operations, and our general staff has initiated some workshops in cooperation with Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean. I think that we can work together in that area, and also the two forces can cooperate with Operation Active Endeavour.

Yesterday, General Maples mentioned what might be done to increase our intelligence sharing. I'm dealing with Iran a lot and its illegal nuclear activities and business, and I would say that we have to cooperate more in exchanging information about Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programs and activities.

Of course, there are certain gaps and things we don't know which require further analysis of what is going on. We have to keep in touch with the developments of the Iranian nuclear program. For me, it's the main threat for our region here, and even beyond a regional threat. All the countries, from the Black Sea and Caspian Sea, and from the Balkans, should fully support United Nations Security Council draft resolution 1540. As we know, it is a resolution condemning networks and even countries involved in sending terrorists nuclear, biological, or chemical materials. I think that United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 is one of the cornerstones of the counter proliferation effort.

The same applies to the Container Security Initiative and also to the Proliferation Security Initiative. I'm not familiar with some of the Caspian states, if they are members to the PSI, but PSI is a very interesting initiative, put forward by President George W. Bush in 2003, during his visit to Poland. I think next October, in my country, we will host a seminar on PSI; last year, we
had a very interesting conference in Italy and Turkey concerning the PSI and how to conduct interdictions on the high seas.

Finally, my last proposals to conclude my presentation, I think that more drills and exercises have to be done with WMD scenarios. I know that the Americans and the Russians, and also some other countries, have done a lot of drills concerning radiological threats and nuclear threats. I would like to see more regional and sub-regional drills in countering materials and weapons of mass destruction proliferation.

All our countries should analyze the lessons learned from Operation Enduring Freedom, from Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the Global War on Terror. I'm always saying that to the general staff of our armed forces. We have to look at all those lessons learned, and we have to see what went wrong and what went right.

We are in a Global War on Terror, a long war. It will take years. We have operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the broader area of Afghanistan, and lessons learned from those areas of fighting insurgency, fighting terrorism, fighting suicide bombers. We have to take them into consideration because it's very important.

Finally, fighting Islamic finance. Recently, following hearings of House committees and those of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, economic committee, and so on, I found interesting the presentations by American experts and members of the various ministries dealing with these threats — the threat of illegal money going to various groups and coming from various sources or even states.

We have to deal with this because of Islam in the Transcaucuses and in Central Asia. There are forces there that are ready for insurgencies. We know who the groups are in Uzbekistan, we know also of other groups in Fergana Valley, and so on. But we have to deal with these new groups because they are very dangerous and some of them have global ramifications.

And of course, protecting eco-systems, as our chairman mentioned, and dealing with climate and environmental changes. We have to work together against disasters like earthquakes, floods, or other events, which unfortunately are taking place.

**DR. IULIAN CHIFU:**

I must underline the fact that I am just an academic. So, please take my remarks as such. My approach will focus more on our mistakes, on the opportunities that we create for terrorist activities, both by countries in the region and EU NATO countries. We need cooperation to tackle these kinds of threats.
So, I will look at three types of threats. First of all, what I call “qualifying” a new generation of terrorists in Transnistria, Crimea, Ruthenia, which is Transcarpathia. But also in Russia and Georgia. Second, how we, all of us, invented the biggest money laundering mechanism at our borders, the laws
on off-shore economy. And third, some places in the Northern Caucasus linked to Wahabi recruitment and to a future Caliphate.

The first point I will present is how we are qualifying a new generation of terrorists, but the actual title is “How to Build Civil Society in Transnistria”. It looks very bright. It looks very professional, and it is used by all our politicians to support democratization. All this begins in 2005, with Yuschenko’s eight point plan on Transnistria for the democratization of the region. Everybody supports this. The West supported it, and it’s supported through building civil society in the region, in the very Transnistria separatist region

So, we have a very bright guy, Dmitri Soin, who is the head of the Department of Protecting the Constitution in Tiraspol, in the Ministry of State Security in Transnistria, and he is also the head of subsidiary of Russian Institute for National Strategy. So, when he learns that money is coming from western sources, he creates some 600 NGOs in three months, just to take the western money.

What was his concept? The concept was to counter-balance the Velvet Revolution with a strategy of counter-fire, as he put it. He used the model of youth organizations in the Orange Revolution, and he built on the 21st of April 2005, the International Youth Corporation Project Breakthrough, with schools teaching the ideals of Che Guevara. They call for political leadership.

1. How to build civil society in Transnistria

Concept:
- “Velvet revolution could not be stopped by either counterrevolutions, or conservative projects, or administrative resources”.
- The “Strategy of Counter Fire”.
- 21 April 2005, creation of the International Youth Corporation “Provy” (“Breakthrough”), with Che Guevara Schools for Political Leadership.
- “If Russian peacekeepers would leave the area, tomorrow NATO tanks will be here.
- Admitting that the “TMR Army” would be unable to resist NATO troops for more than two hours, anti-NATO war is based on organising terrorist attacks.
Besides, the concept says that if Russian peace-keepers will leave Transnistria, in two hours NATO troop can arrive in Tiraspol, and it seems the Army cannot face this kind of threat. So, that’s why he needs an alternative strategy to tackle this and the basic strategy that is supported and taught to young generations in these so-called Che Guevara schools.

What is trained? How to make bombs from usual products, shooting, diversions, misinformation skills, creating unrest, so on and so forth. Basically, it’s training, together with the representatives from the Crimea, Transcarpathia, Russia, NASHI (the national organization, “Ours!”), and the paramilitary movement Bratstvo. They have very well known trainers, and as of September 2005, they have the first graduates that received diplomas from this school, after something like three months training, including practical activities.

So, we are in the process of seeing the creation and training of a new generation of terrorists. What is in the environment in Transnistria at this particular moment? We have a huge number of weapons available, small weapons, basically, at the disposal of everybody, left from the war period taken from factories that are producing them.

We have a lot of domestic fights using weapons. If somebody cuts your tree, you take the weapons and you shoot the guy; and we have two bombings, which were accidental, in terms that they were not designed to explode on public transportation in Tiraspol, but they were designed for revenge on a factory that cut your job or to other targets.

1. How to build civil society in Transnistria

• Che Guevara Schools teach the organisation members to attack “behind enemy lines” – to make bombs from common products, shooting with small arms, misinformation skills, creating unrest, etc.

• Training together with representatives from Crimea, Transcarpathia, Russia – Nashi (Ours) and members of the paramilitary movement “Bratstvo”

• On 9 September 2005 the first graduates received their diploma after three weeks of training courses. They are now ready to undertake any “direct action”

Creating and training a new generation of terrorists!!!
The training of those guys happened in the period of summer/autumn 2005 and was done through incidents provoked at the OEC Mission building in Tiraspol, twice with riots and by taking the flag and replacing it with the Proriv flag.

1. How to build civil society in Transnistria

Environment

- Weapons at their disposal – everybody has small weapons from the war or buys from military, even produced in Transnistrian factories. Those are used in domestic fights for any current dispute.

- Two home-made bombs did explode “accidentally” in public transportation.

Training in such a “strategy”- violent actions

- Incident at the OSCE mission building in Tiraspol on September 27, 2005: 250 young people blocked the mission and replaced its flag with the “Prorvy” banner.

- Attack on other NGO’s seminars - World Window, 23 March 2007.

- Blocking a meeting with David Franz, US consul in Chisinau – he couldn’t even enter the region.

- Attack on Human Rights organization meetings: Helsinki Committee Moldova, Stefan Uritu attacked with ink.

- Noise, protests, assault on the meeting room, preventing the meeting from taking place.

- Instigators, as well as the participants in such actions, always enjoy complete impunity.
We had attacks at seminars. We had blockage of the U.S. Consul at the border, and attacks with noise, assaults at the meeting rooms that prevented things from taking place. All the instigators, as well as the participants of such actions always enjoyed complete impunity.

Proriv is not only a question of the separatist region of Transnistria from Moldova. It’s also a regional problem. Proriv has developed branches in Crimea and in Novan — in Transcarpathia, what they call Ruthenia. Their purpose is basically to make riots, to make all kinds of unrest, and to fight, not for independence of the region, but for separatism and for reunification with Russia. This is the basic model.

They also participated in a riot organized in January 2006, with this kind of goal, that is, separatism. But also, they contributed in the summer of 2006, together with the Eurasia Youth Union, to an anti-NATO rally that provoked public unrest, disorder, and blocked exercises from taking place.

Another point is that Proriv has joined forces with what we call the Crimean Cossacks, which are a kind of paramilitary organization, actively participating in fueling conflicts between Crimean Tartars and Slavs in the region, and engaged in actions against businessmen. They are considered to be something between organized crime and a paramilitary group.

What is interesting is that the authorities just found two of the 49 Cossack organizations to be illegal and that all these prepared paramilitary forces are moving around the region, helping and supporting the separatist break-away regions, including those in Georgia.
In recent developments, this Proriv became a political party on 2 June, 2006. It claims its models are youth organizations in Ukraine, Serbia, Georgia, and Slovakia. Partnerships with this organization include the Scottish Nationalist Party. They have been invited to forums and conferences in

**PRORIV Tiraspol - recent developments:**

- Alena Arshinova is formally the head of Breakthrough
- Registered as a political party, on 2 June 2006.

**Recognition**

- Delegates have been part of the international youth meeting "Foros", in forums and conferences in Estonia, Kaliningrad and Abkhazia
- Financial support from EU countries, as “NGO’s,” framework of supporting the “civil society”. 
Estonia and Kaliningrad. They have gotten support for this work by being NGOs as part of civil society.

I’ll move to the second point I would like to make: this is money laundering. On 12 April 2007, we had a proposal from the president of the Republic of Moldova for three laws on tax amnesty, on the legalization of capital, and on income tax system reform.

It is applicable to all the citizens and businesses in Moldova, though we had to pay five percent to legalize the capital that we already had. No fiscal authorities are allowed to enter and verify sources of income that happened before 1 January 2007. The conditions of the law cannot be applied.

This freed assets that arrested companies had for reinvestment and for business expansion. What was expected from this kind of sudden reform? It was proposed one day; it was accepted by the government the next; and it passed the Parliament in one week.

It was expected to be a fiscal paradise for investors, including foreign ones, and to help the development of the Moldova economy, with the reduction of illegal activities, salary raises in the real sector, and the reduction of the invisible or black economy and corruption.

It also had a side effect on Transnistria and the separatists in this field. However, another side effect was that the Republic of Moldova became the huge off-shore zone. Money laundering is at its lowest price, since you have to pay only five percent of the declared capital, and 50 percent when you’re withdrawing your capital in a shorter period than three years.
The amnesty stimulated efficiency of those who were poor and disfavored those who had paid all their taxes. It's bad for competition and the fiscal amnesty and zero tax do not fit the commitments made to the IMF.

2. Money laundering

Expected positive outcomes

- A fiscal paradise for investors, including foreign ones
- An intensive development of Moldovan economy with the reduction of the illegal one
- Salary raises in the real sector and foundation of a middle class
- Reduction of the invisible economy
- Passing a good part of the illegal turnover of cash into the official money circulation
- Reduction of the room where corruption may develop.

Side effects:

- The Republic of Moldova became a huge off-shore zone.
- Money laundering is at the lowest price ever: 5% declared capital, 15% on retreat before three years time (foreign investment law).
- The amnesty will stimulate the inefficiency of those who work poorly and will discriminate against those who pay all their taxes. Bad for competition.
My third point, the third threat, I will divide into two parts. The first one is about the next generation of terrorists, being prepared in the Northern Caucasus. The second part will focus on Shamil Basaev and the idea of the Caliphate that is now being taken over by an official, Ramzan Kadirov, the president of Chechnya.

As you already know, the Northern Caucasus is an unstable region. There are three countries that embrace Islam. There are a lot of terrorist attacks. It’s an underdeveloped region, and unemployment is between 60 percent and 80 percent. The administration and public services are paid by the Russian Central Government, since the regions cannot produce what they need for themselves. In such conditions there is a huge attraction to Islam. Islam, including radical Islam, is being accepted and embraced by the population. What is happening? In this situation, we have a move toward militant groups, anger, and resentment, due to the frustration of the local population and the influence of Wahhabis. With 70 percent unemployment, we have a good place for recruitment, recruitment to send people to Wahhabi schools, Islamic schools, especially in Saudi Arabia. Somewhere around 5,000 persons are now learning in radical Islamic schools.

We have a time bomb in the Caucasus. It is in Russia’s interest to stabilize both the South Caucasus and the wider Black Sea region. If we have a secure bloc in the wider Black Sea region, it is a good step toward stabilizing the Northern Caucasus and toward stabilizing maybe the greater Middle East, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

### 3. Northern Caucasus

#### The next generation of terrorism

- Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia – Islam
- Adygea, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachai-Cherkessia, North Ossetia subjects to terrorism – attacks
- Underdeveloped region
- Wide spread unemployment: from 80% Chechnya to 60% Kabardino-Balkaria
- Administration, public services, projects – budgeting by Russian central government
- Corruption, lawless Russian and local officials.
- Attracted by Islam that they discovered overnight
- Embrace and meet radical Islam through international recruitment
- Wahhabi representatives from Islamic schools, teaching and preaching radical Islam.
My last point goes to the former Chechen radical terrorist Shamil Basaev and the idea of making an Islamic Caliphate in the Northern Caucasus. This idea was very much feared and Basaev was hunted down and killed. But in the meantime, we have a new president in Chechnya, Ramzan Kadirov. He is the son of the former president and runs parts of the Northern Caucasus.
region like a mafia boss. It is little known, but Ramzan Kadirov has embraced Wahhabism. He wants to rebuild the Chechen Republic, together with the parts of the North Caucasus that are Islamic. He has a private militia that is now freely moving in the Northern Caucasus, as did the Chechen rebels. They are also using a kind of protection tax, which is the same as the revolutionary taxes of Shamil Basaev. The difference is that Ramzan Kadirov is officially appointed and is not a terrorist. He is an official partner of Putin, and my guess is that he will be a huge problem.

By the way, we know that the Kadirovs were involved in several attacks in Moscow, killing some human rights activities, executing journalists, and killing a bank director. Some of them were arrested by the police but were freed by the FSB. So, my warning is that we will face the problem of an official terrorist, which is a huge problem.

I conclude my remarks, coming back to the idea that this kind of threat has to be tackled in the region and that it's a question of cooperation by all of those countries to tackle these kinds of threats. Let me underline one of my general statements that the NATO framework offers the mechanism necessary for us to advance. I'm quite sure that it will help in the security sector reform and integration, and the exchanges of intelligence to tackle terrorist activity especially.
DR. DROUGOS:

First of all, I would like to say that the report by the State Department was a very comprehensive one, describing the problems of terrorism in each of the countries on the globe. There were also quite a number of interesting ideas concerning fighting terrorism. I would like to mention that some of the thoughts were very specialized and comprehensive with a lot of interesting materials.

Second, I would like to mention the case of modern terrorism, especially in the Black Sea region and United Nations Security Resolution 1514 of April 2004, dealing with criminal activities related to the trafficking of nuclear, chemical, and other materials, which I think could be the cornerstone of a multi-lateral approach to fighting the proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction.

Finally, I would like to mention the very important role of the European Command, the United States European Command, which has programs to help in fighting drugs and limiting the trafficking of materials for weapons of mass destruction. I think, from the multi-lateral point of view, there are a lot of things that could come up in NATO as positive developments for stability in the reconstruction of the area.
DR. BURGHART:

I’d like to bring the session to a close, with just a couple of general comments. While we addressed them individually, I think everybody realizes that these problems overlap and compound themselves. The questions of AIDS may not seem significant until you look at the trafficking paths for human beings. I supervised a master’s thesis at Georgetown for a very bright student, who tracked the trafficking of females, specifically in the sex trade, and you could see the spread of AIDS along those paths, which devastated the local populations. All of us realize that while the drug trade in itself is devastating, the drug trade also provides profits that support terrorists.

One nightmare scenario: you may remember several months ago, when the Pope visited Istanbul, we were looking at different scenarios of what could go wrong. And the worst one we came up with, and thank God it did not occur, was an Islamic organization trying to make a statement, detonating a nuclear device at the strait next to Istanbul, where the Pope was. The bomb not only devastated the city, but it killed the Pope, disrupted the oil trade on the Black Sea, which is 10 percent of the world’s energy supply, and created the world’s largest ecological disaster. That’s a terrible image to have, but at the same time, it only takes one such event to throw the world into chaos. Our job is to try and address these scenarios to ensure they never occur.

LTG Michael D. Maples, Director, DIA presents a token of appreciation for co-chairing the symposium to MG Francisc Radici, General Director, General Directorate for Defense Intelligence, Romania.

LTG Michael D. Maples and BG Gheorghe Savu exchange gifts and congratulations on a successful conference on the last day of the symposium.
The Role of The Intelligence Services in Improvement of The Regional Security and Trust Building Mechanisms for Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation

PRESIDENT CLIFT:

It is now our pleasure to discuss the role of the intelligence services in improving regional security and trust-building mechanisms for bi-lateral and multi-lateral cooperation. Our panelists include General Sergiu Medar, the former national security advisor to the president of Romania; Brigadier General Brian Keller, director of intelligence, United States European Command and, perhaps of equal importance, an alumnus of my college; and Brigadier General Gheorghe Savu, chief of the Military Intelligence Directorate of Romania.

What I would say to all of you is that this panel brings us to the very heart of our work. We're at the point where we've wanted to arrive. It involves the interests and the work of all those present and, following the presentations, I look forward to opening this subject to general discussion.

GENERAL MEDAR:

What I'd like to do now is identify and find ways of working together because it is very clear that all of us have a common interest in this area. I'd like to make some proposals for sharing information and for the mechanisms to do this. Of late, many analysts have changed their approach regarding the Black Sea area. We can now talk about the wider Black Sea area, or Black Sea and Caspian Sea area. The wider Black Sea area presumed the traditional approach of security, that is economic, political, and social aspects of countries such as Moldova, Armenia, or Azerbaijan. Now, any analysis of this area must consider that security issues are mostly asymmetrical threats.

The Black Sea and Caspian Sea area concept must take into consideration the security of energy resources and transportation corridors; our security approach starts from these principles and from these objectives. When we talk about the Black Sea, we can see not only beautiful beaches and nice people, but vulnerabilities, which could come from bad governing processes, not because of the governments themselves, but because of the times and the
situation. We can also mention huge ethnic diversity as a vulnerability. There are reports showing that in this area there are 148 groups recognized as ethnic communities.

The transformation of governing systems from communist to capitalist, from totalitarian to democracy, from a military offensive treaty, the Warsaw Treaty organization, to a security alliance, NATO; all these should be considered vulnerabilities. Risks are generated when vulnerabilities are not well managed. We can see in the area almost the entire spectrum of asymmetrical risks: terrorists, drug trafficking, armaments trafficking, illegal immigration, financial fraud, and so on. Threats are generated when risks are not well managed. Some analysts don’t agree that there are asymmetrical threats in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea area. But we cannot pretend that this is true, as long as, according to official reports, 80 percent of illegal drugs consumed in Western Europe come from the Black Sea area.

We cannot pretend that there are not asymmetrical threats, as long as armament factories are still in production in Transnistria, whose product is sent to unknown locations. Some reports say that there are 14 factories that produce armaments in Transnistria. There are a lot of other examples, including attempts to recruit future terrorists in the countries of the Black Sea area, as well as conflicts that are generated when threats are not well managed.

Frozen, and sometimes thawing, conflicts from Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh are examples of these. We know that in a final statement from NATO, the term “frozen conflict” was not used because during the negotiation process for this final statement, the term came under question. But these so-called “frozen conflicts” have regional relevance, and they can have regional impacts. So in the final statement from NATO, these conflicts are called regional conflicts.

The connection between these regional conflicts and the Kosovo situation has been mentioned here and that Kosovo independence may be used as a precedent for Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh.
My opinion is that, of course, this can be used but only as a bad academic exercise because it’s very clear that Kosovo is an ethnic conflict. Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia are not ethnic conflicts. Nagorno-Karabakh is an ethnic conflict, but there is a huge difference. Nagorno-Karabakh is a conflict between two sovereign states, which is not the case in Kosovo. Taking this into account, these countries must try to find solutions to enhance their security and to assure the good management of these vulnerabilities, risks, threats, and conflicts. The key to the security solutions up to now has been naval cooperation, but in my opinion, we have to take into consideration that threats are not coming from the water but mostly from the ground.

This is why I think, besides naval measures, it is necessary to improve cooperation between our countries to find other ways of cooperating. The basis for all cooperation is mutual trust. This meeting is an excellent beginning for the process of increasing the security of our countries through mutual trust. The fact that we are here together to discuss our security in the region in which we live is the best proof of the potential for our countries to cooperate. From the security point of view, European Union and NATO enlargement are sometimes seen as offensive acts. If we try to look at the essence of the process, however, the reality is that this is not a political military alliance enlargement. This is a democracy enlargement.

The democratic enlargement process cannot be seen as an offensive one. We have to take into account that the democracy consolidation process is supported by all the countries from the region. This is a new approach, which includes energy transportation security solutions. NATO is no longer a political military alliance but is predominantly a security alliance. Starting from this reality, to consolidate the security of the area, we must move to the next
step of enhancing the cooperation of the countries represented around the table. I think that the next step is the process of sharing information between Black Sea countries and Caspian Sea countries.

From the beginning, I want to make clear the difference between information and intelligence. As you know, information is collected exclusively from open sources, using legal means. When we talk about intelligence, the approach is very different. In the collection process, we should use all of the human and technical methods directed to obtain data. Between countries belonging to the same alliance, we can talk about sharing intelligence. This process is under very strict regulation, established between countries and intelligence organizations, especially regarding sources and technology protection. There may be reluctance in sharing intelligence. But it is possible to protect sources and technologies and, at the same time, share intelligence. This has been proven. People and organizations that are reluctant to share intelligence may not be able to protect their sources, or they don’t have consistent products to share. Sharing information is a very different thing.

Here, all the information is coming from open sources. In the intelligence sharing process, we make efforts to cover and protect the source. In information sharing, the source must be very precisely mentioned. There is high value in sharing information between countries and intelligence organizations; it’s a good start to develop a dialogue in an area that not long ago was considered taboo. This is the best way for countries to identify their common security interests. It is the best way to clarify definitions of terms which otherwise could create confusion and misunderstanding. We could help each partner improve its own analytical methods, learning from each other in the cooperation process. This is the first step in cooperation.
For some organizations, this is a moment of truth, because they can realize where they stand in terms of the quality of their information. Even if we are talking about open sources, the value comes from the national interpretation of information. Sharing information from open sources, mostly coming from the national level which cannot be easily obtained from the outside, would be a first step. Sharing information is also a good excuse for analysts to meet and to talk about their common areas of interest to the mutual benefit of all. Sharing information is sharing culture, which is great in this world of globalization when every country is looking for its place in the world.

In the age of the internet, unclassified information sharing could bring huge benefits to all of us. Some people might say that this is not the business of intelligence services but the business of NGOs, universities, and so on. My opinion is that such a view could come only from somebody who has never worked in intelligence. By experience, intelligence experts accu-
mulate a natural instinct. This is the capability to identify a future risk from something which, for a common citizen, is absolutely normal. In other words, intelligence experts can see what is not normal in a normal world for normal people. This is the huge value which intelligence experts bring to an information sharing process. In our areas of interest, we can identify a wide range of subjects to approach. Almost all of the intelligence services’ targets could have an information sharing approach.

Information sharing is, in my opinion, the best solution for the trust building process, which started with this conference. What we are doing here now is, in fact, an information sharing process in its first phases. Why not continue this process for all of our countries’ best interests? And last, but not least, I want to underline that in the process of sharing information, we share national cultures and national spirit. We spread our national values, trying to open windows to the world.

I would like to talk a little bit about a mechanism for sharing information, sharing unclassified information. All PfP countries take advantage of benefits from the PIMS system, which is the system for transport and databases of classified and unclassified information. Because all of our countries are NATO countries or PfP countries, we can take advantage of this system. This is only a proposal for you to think about: we should consider using this system for sharing unclassified and open source information, and having a database, a Black Sea and Caspian Sea database, where each of us can introduce unclassified information and all of us have access to this information. This is one of the purposes that I think this system could be used for.

Another purpose is that through this system, as was mentioned yesterday, everyone could send an early warning signal or early warning information about a possible terrorist attack. Even if only to say that it is not confirmed or it’s from an open source. This would be very helpful for the security of all of our countries and the best proof of our cooperation and friendship.

GENERAL KELLER:

It’s not lost on me that we have the opportunity to learn from the intelligence services of six or seven former Soviet Republics and two Warsaw pact nations. Although it’s been 17 years, many of the important intelligence lessons you learned in this region between the Black Sea and Caspian Sea are still important for us today. So, we have a great opportunity to learn from you, all of us together.

I’m going to talk a little bit about information sharing as General Medar brought up, but I’d like to start off by going back to the original question, which is the role of intelligence services. From my perspective, I will talk about military intelligence services. I will not address the entire U.S. intelli-
gence community. I will not deal with the Central Intelligence Agency. I will talk, because I am talking to mostly military members, about the military intelligence services.

First, think about the old way of business. We spy on each other. Azerbaijan spies on Armenia. Turkey spies on Greece. The United States spies on everybody. Bulgaria spies on Romania. That's the old way of thinking. We all prepare assessments that no one else reads, just us. We make predictions, few of which ever come true, and we always make the worst case prediction. That's the old way of thinking. In the new way of thinking, and General Medar summed it up, cooperation against common threats and interests is a must. We must share the information and intelligence that drive our policy makers and elected officials to make decisions. If we don't do that, then our work is useless.

With that as a background, I see three major roles for today’s intelligence services in the Caspian and Black Sea region. It's a building block approach. The first is to build up regional capacity and interoperability. We need to have a baseline of these regional capabilities, and we need to practice regional cooperation between all of our intelligence services, especially the military and law enforcement agencies. Each of our nations, each of our services, has very important strengths and niche capabilities, and each of us has some limitations and weaknesses. So, to mix and match all of our capabilities, to offset the limitations that we have, is an important piece.

Second is dynamic information sharing, and I really can’t address this more adequately than what General Medar just talked about. But at the end of the day, we have to create an intelligence communication system that has the ability for regional cross talk, and I would also offer with law enforcement entities. The third role I see for our military services is to cause action. Some people call that actionable intelligence. This can cause our organizations to serve a forcing function, to synchronize diverse intelligence services and law enforcement information that assist each of our nations in developing leads and, eventually, courses of action against targets with regional ties.

Let me give you a quick example, and I think all of you, from your own country perspectives, will have a much better appreciation of this. There may be criminal elements and there may be terrorist facilitators from different nations. They work together to forge documents, to launder money, to move drugs, which they use to help finance extremist activities. They know no borders. They communicate extremely well together. They have a very effective internet capability. Their network extends throughout the region. It doesn’t stop at borders. They all contribute to providing the means for enabling terrorist cells to operate in the region. Some of the terrorist cells are inspired by
regional or specific state-like requirements. Others are inspired by networks like al Qaeda, as far away as Waziristan in Pakistan.

Now, military intelligence organizations generally have good surveillance and tracking capabilities for ships and aircraft of interest, while law enforcement activities walk the street beats. They know the people. They know what changes. They know criminals and criminal activities. National services have the ability to bring a lot of this information together and leverage the capabilities of other nations in the region. This may sound simple, but it's very difficult. In Europe, for example, where I work with NATO especially, there are many diverse nations in this region. They each have different capabilities, and sometimes they don't want to cooperate. The laws that are in place were for a very over-governed region and often aid the terrorists. Terrorists can use the Schengen laws, for example, to move internally inside of many European Union nations.

There's also a history and a culture of secrecy in our organizations. This is the way many of us were trained, especially when we grew up as young lieutenants. Operational security is probably something that was drilled into our heads. But as General Medar has eloquently said, now it is our task to break down these barriers. So, let me quickly go into some of the key points for each of these three roles that I see, for our intelligence organizations.

Building regional capacity and interoperability: U.S. European Command works with our Office of Defense Cooperation in each of the countries within our area of responsibility to assist building partner-nation capabilities, and I'll try to address how we do that, especially in Africa. Although it's not this region, it provides a good back-drop.

One of the main reasons we build partner-nation capabilities is because of interoperability, and although it's been 17 years or so since the demise of the former Soviet Union, it would be interesting to see how the Soviet military tried to use interoperability, not only with Warsaw pact nations, but with its own republics, many of which have different cultures and histories, and speak different languages. So, your perspectives there would be very interesting.

We have to build a common operational language, not just an actual language of military jargon. We have to build common doctrines and TTP's. Within NATO, the Romanians have very aggressively looked at establishing a human intelligence center of excellence because there is none in NATO. There are no standard procedures for the interrogation and the movement of data when it comes to human intelligence. It's a big gap right now for NATO, and I would suggest it's a gap for this region as well, and we have to build common architectures, which means we have to be able to pass information, sometimes classified, but mostly unclassified information.
Many of the countries here most likely have the same collection targets. If we thought about this region and we thought about what all of your national assemblies and parliaments and military leaders were looking at as information requirements, I suggest that you would probably think a good maritime and air picture is important. You would be concerned about the smuggling of persons or materials, certainly narcotics smuggling, associated terrorist activity, economic targets, including countering piracy, pollution and encroachment on economic exclusion zones. All these are your requirements. They are our requirements; now how do we approach solving these problems? How many of us work together to ensure that we have a good operational, a common operational, picture or that we are not being redundant and wasting precious resources, when someone else is collecting the same information?

I would also suggest when it comes to building regional capacity that we, as intelligence professionals, must go back and lobby our policy makers for a commitment to fund intelligence priorities. In my military, it's often more important to buy more C-17's or more tanks or more helicopters than it is to train human intelligence professionals, which doesn't come at a large cost, but is a huge investment. You may have similar issues in your own militaries.

Let me switch gears very briefly to sharing information, and I can be brief here because General Medar has already, very adequately, covered this very important topic. He discussed the information we need to share, and I agree 100 percent that too often open source intelligence is overlooked because it's not sexy. It's not the traditional way that we collect information. But I can tell you in my own government, open source intelligence is becoming a huge method of gathering information that is very accurate and often overlooked, and it's very good because it can be easily shared with our partners, without going through a process we call disclosure. From my perspective at U.S. European Command, the information that is often collected against these kinds of problems is collected by the National Security Agency or the Central Intelligence Agency, and those organizations, because of the sensitive sources and methods they use, will put “no foreign dissemination” on the material.

This makes it a challenge and, although this information often is passed to your secret security services, it is not passed to the military because your nations have asked us not to pass it back to the military, if you can believe that. So, unclassified information becomes very useful and a very important tool for us.

Another system that you should be very familiar with is the automated identification system. Again, it is an unclassified system. It's used to track merchant vessels, and it is a very useful system because there are over 40,000 merchant carriers now, over 300 tons, that carry these systems. They broadcast on a radio system, the location, latitude and longitude of the ship,
the name of the captain, the cargo, the manifest, its port of destination, and its port of embarkation. What's useful about this is that if the ship diverts to a different location, it can be identified as a vessel of interest, and your navies and other forces have the authority to board that ship and to query the captain about why he turned off his ship beacon, against the mandate of the International Maritime Commission.

This information, collected in collaboration with coastal radars and other sources, can give you a good sense of where things are flowing on the Black Sea and, more importantly, which ships may be trying to avoid detection, which would alert you to the possible movement of narcotics, human trafficking, or other activities.

Finally, the third point is intelligence cooperation that causes action; we call it actionable intelligence. By definition, intelligence should be used to drive some kind of decision, or it's useless. We can't ever just do intelligence for the sake of doing intelligence. We all know this. Our goal is to cause some kind of action. In our case, our mission here is to continue to build this relationship, to cause action. As General Medar said, it's very important because it builds trust between our organizations.

I think at this juncture, I would close and simply say that these three roles, in my mind at least, will assist this group of nations to work towards common goals that are important to our elected leaders, and provide security and stability as well as enhance economic growth and prosperity in the region.

All of that is of great importance to the United States because a peaceful region with so many economic opportunities and so many opportunities for stability is something that will be of benefit, in my mind, not only to the European Union and NATO, but to all of us.

**BG SAVU:**

What I plan to talk about to you today is the role of military intelligence in the region of security, and specifically about the Romanian case.

I chose this topic because in the last 17 years, Romania has gone from the military intelligence point of view, through many transformations, and we have reached an organization that we think is the best for our country, at least in this period of time and for the next several years. We think that sharing experience is as important as sharing intelligence or information, as my colleagues have talked about already.

So, I will touch mostly on Romanian issues, hoping that some of our ideas, some of our experiences, will help the countries that are around the table.
But before going to the next slide, I would like to talk a little bit about the model on this slide, and I am sure that every military intelligence professional with us has been confronted with this situation. It’s an issue that is confronting everybody, and I think we all should do our best to keep our services as far as possible from any political involvement.

I will talk a little bit about the history of our region because, in my opinion, to better know who you are and where you should go or what you can do, you have to know your region. You have to know from where you have emerged.

I will talk a little bit about the role of military intelligence in the Romanian Armed Forces. After that, I will cover the involvement of military intelligence, the assets of our country in different areas, in different sectors of operations, and you will see that we have quite an impressive deployment, if you take into account the size of the Romanian Armed Forces.
I also will try to touch on the subject of lessons learned from our experience. We have done many good things, but sometimes we didn’t choose the right way to transfer our intelligence. So, I think the ideas that we are going to discuss will be helpful for you, as well.
Everybody agrees that the world changed after the 9/11 events, but what I want to tell you is that even before the events of 9/11, in our military intelligence, we realized that asymmetrical transnational threats were becoming more and more important, and thanks to General Medar’s ideas we have established an analysis capability for dealing with transnational issues, and we had to instruct and to educate our collection agencies to be able to collect this kind of intelligence, regarding the asymmetrical or transnational terrorist risks and threats towards our security.

I think it was the right choice. The events that surprised the world did not surprise us on 9/11 because we had already about two years of experience in this field. We were able to adapt ourselves pretty easily to the new environment.

Talking about history, as you can see on this slide, the birthday of the military intelligence capability or organization in Romania dates from November 1859, one hundred years older than me. So, we have about 140 years of continuity as a military intelligence structure in the Romanian Armed Forces. There were good times for military intelligence, and there were bad times for military intelligence. It’s usually during World War II and during the communism period, but honestly speaking, we have this feeling of belonging to a very old service, probably one of the oldest military services in the world.

The founder of the first military intelligence structure in Romania was Cuza. He is very important to our military intelligence history, and I
would like to read to you four missions he attached to the military intelligence capability 148 years ago. The first one is to study the military forces of various foreign states, a mission that is still valid today. The second one is to survey the scientific methods for the Armed Forces of interest. We do the same today.

The third one is to settle the training standards for various categories of the Armed Forces and Army Corps during the campaign. We are doing this by informing our planners, our operational colleagues, about the threats in the world. Fourth is to put in writing the history of the Armed Forces campaigns and great operations. This is about lessons learned. There are the first four missions of the military intelligence structure, that was established 148 years ago — and you know very well that they are still valid today.

Coming back to the present, there are some milestones in our developments. The first one was of course in 1990, when we succeeded in getting rid of communism, and we switched to a democratic system, and we have developed, since the very first day, the military intelligence capability in Romania, because during communism it was a capability, but honestly speaking, it was not a very well developed one. It was mostly based on counter-intelligence and defense.

After 1990, we realized that military intelligence has to assume new missions, and for that it has to develop new capabilities. Finally, we convinced our leaders that military intelligence could be a niche capability for Romania, serving both national interests and being our contribution to the alliance, to NATO, to you, and to all our strategic partners.

We have transformed ourselves. I would like to refer to the year 1999, when for the first time in the history of the Romanian Armed Forces, counter-intelligence and military intelligence came together, and since then they have remained under the same umbrella. Today, General Radici is the chief of military intelligence and counter-intelligence. He is the umbrella of these two directorates, and I will discuss a little later the advantages of having such a structure in our Armed Forces.

Another point—we changed the names, becoming a NATO member and EU member state. We had to transform ourselves all the time, to be able to cope with the new challenges. But all the time, at least from 1990 up to now, we took into account several principles. First of all, we wanted to have a very flexible service. We wanted to have the ability to relocate money and resources and to be able to respond quickly to any mission that we were given by our leaders. Even now we are working very hard on giving the responsibility to the people, giving the power to decide to the lowest level of command.

Why? Because this saves a lot of time. The real experts in any field, including military intelligence, are the leaders at the first level. So, we are try-
ing to change our mentality. We are trying to build a system, so the decision process is pushed down as far as possible, to the first levels of command.

Of course, we had to transform, after we joined NATO and EU, because new missions and new mechanisms of cooperation appeared. Romania has always been determined to do its best and to do as much as possible for these organizations.

Meanwhile, international cooperation became extremely important. My predecessor talked about the role and the importance of sharing intelligence. Now, we cannot operate in isolation. We cannot face all the challenges. You have to talk to your friends. You have to share intelligence. You have to build the right mechanisms to be able to share, not only information, unclassified information, but real intelligence. That's why we have succeeded in developing this cooperation, both at the national level and the international level. Right now, we are cooperating with more than 30 services in the world. With some of them, we have very extensive cooperation. With some of them, decently good cooperation. With some of them, we are still working to increase our cooperation.

Talking about cooperation, I would like to point out that looking around this table, there are 12 countries represented and, unfortunately for us, we couldn't do more than that. We don't cooperate with more than five countries, and perhaps, one of the achievements of this symposium would be to let us develop new ways of cooperating with each other.
Now, we know each other. We know our capabilities because we have talked during the social part of the program, during the breaks, and I hope at least from the Romanian side, that we’ll succeed in increasing or developing cooperation with the countries that are around the table.

So, that’s why we are talking about sharing intelligence and cooperation. We are talking in our directorate about cooperation in intelligence because it’s a very important source of intelligence for every modern service these days. We don’t have to cover all the areas, all the fields, because we are not capable of doing so. Very often, you have to rely on your partners, and for us, I must tell you that it’s extremely beneficial, very advantageous to cooperate, to get intelligence, or to provide intelligence to your partners.

One of the other issues that we were facing in the last year was the amount of intelligence we have to process. That’s been quite a challenge for us, so we had to develop our service, to hire new people, to hire specialists, linguists, IT specialists, financial people, and specialists in different areas that were not very common previously. We had to develop a very strong IT capability and communications system. It’s not possible to cope with this amount of intelligence, without designing the proper IT systems. Another challenge, another difficulty for us was how to convince the collection agencies, the collectors, that they have to collect the intelligence you’ve asked for, not the intelligence they think is useful to you, or the intelligence they find easily.

So, there are a couple of challenges, and I must have said that I probably will never finish with these kinds of challenges.

To better understand who we are and what we do, I would like to stop a little bit on this slide. This is the general organization of the Ministry of Defense in Romania. As you can see here on the slide, there is the General Defense Intelligence Directorate and General Radich is the director general of this directorate. He has, under his control, military intelligence and counterintelligence. The main role of this directorate is to control, coordinate, and integrate military intelligence and counterintelligence. As you can see, there is an arrow that goes from the chief of the General Staff to military intelligence. That means that military intelligence has double subordination, both to the director general and to General Radich and to the chief of defense staff. Why is that? Because we integrated our organization.

So, in fact, the chief of Military Intelligence Directorate is double-hatted. He is the only one in the Romanian Armed Forces that has two bosses, and probably the most important challenge for him is to stay in this square, somewhere in between the two chiefs, which at present is working very well. It all depends on the leaders and their mentality.

Regarding the J2, we realized that Romania has to integrate all its intel-capabilities. It doesn’t matter if these are tactical capabilities or strategic
capabilities, in the same organization, because this way, you can replicate the efforts. Previously, there were two organizations, a J2 and a military intelligence directorate, and of course there was competition. Everybody tried to develop capabilities to be better than the other. It was a waste of human and financial resources.

Now we integrate all the military intelligence assets in the Romanian Armed Forces, in the Military Intelligence Directorate, and they are subordinated to us, both administratively, especially the strategic capabilities, and operationally. Even if they belong to the services from the operational point of view, military intelligence is in charge of them. So, another major achievement for such an organization is that now we are able to provide to all the military and political military leaders a single integrated intel picture.

Now, there is a single paper that goes both to the minister and to the chief of the General Staff, and the intelligence is the same for everybody. There is no competing intelligence, where the intelligence from one organization was sometimes different from the intelligence provided by the military intelligence, due to the lack of analyst and coalition capability. So, we’re seeing that, at least for Romania and for countries like Romania, this is the best solution for organizing military intelligence, to incorporate the J2 inside the structure and to own, at least operationally, all the intel assets in the Romanian Armed Forces.

Regarding missions, there are missions that are probably common to most of the services that are present here. First, we have to prevent strategic
surprise, all the time. We have to give warnings to our leaders, if that's the case, so we are able to prevent strategic surprise. We have to analyze the international situation, to forecast its evolution, to predict how the security situation in our area of responsibility will evolve over the years. We have to preserve the vital military interests of Romania and its military security, by providing the right intelligence to the decision makers in Romania. We have to monitor conflicts in crisis areas because they can be a source of risk, and that can affect Romania as well.

We have to provide the right intelligence to the Romanian troops deployed abroad right now. The main mission today is to protect our troops by providing the right intelligence to the commanders in the field, not only for Romanian troops, but also for coalition forces that are present in the same area where we have our troops. Of course, we have to assist the Romanian Armed Forces in their modernization because we still are in the process of modernizing our forces and have to see how other modern armed forces are transforming themselves, and we have to provide the right intelligence from this perspective as well.

I touched on the subject of transnational issues. You cannot separate purely military issues from transnational issues, because they are very often interrelated, interconnected with each other. We are trying to deal with these kinds of issues, not only with the interests of the military intelligence, but with the interest of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense.
We have to liaise between the Ministry of Defense and different organizations in the Ministry of Defense and their counterparts abroad because we own the defense attachés, and the Ministry of Defense of Romania has a very important role in performing defense diplomacy. We are responsible for signal intelligence and electronic warfare at the strategic level. As with all capabilities, we are trying to balance them because you cannot rely all the time on just one capability. You need to collect intelligence from all sources, using all kinds of collection capabilities.

Of course, electronic warfare is very important, especially at a technical level, and we have capabilities deployed in Iraq. Brian Keller told you about the importance of this capability. But we are trying not to lose the human capability because this is the most important capability a military intelligence service should have. Real intelligence comes from humans. You cannot fight terrorism; you cannot fight transnational issues without a strong human capability, and it's quite a challenge because it's often very tempting to go with the electronic capability. You don't risk the lives of your soldiers. You just monitor all the media, and if you have a very strong analytical capability, you can produce very, very good products. But finally, as I mentioned earlier, to fight the new threats, you have to rely on, and develop, very strong human capabilities.

In terms of deployments abroad, Romania has now more than 2,000 soldiers deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans, and more than 10
percent of these soldiers are intelligence officers and NCOs. When we deploy our troops we have two goals. First is to provide the right intelligence to all commanders so they are able to plan their missions and to protect their troops. Second is our contribution to coalition efforts, to our strategic partners.

Generally speaking, in every theater of operation, we deploy what are called mixed-national intelligence. This makes the analysts’ role integral, so they make products that are of use to the commanders in the field. They have to liaise with the local commands, and they have to coordinate the efforts of the international and Romanian troops in the field. When we have a larger deployment, we always have a special intelligence detachment, and, usually, it’s an all-source intelligence collection and analysis unit. In Iraq, they have HUMINT and CI capabilities.

Of course, we have individual officers in some commands doing liaison between our intelligence and the command, or doing jobs within the command. I just want to remind you that there is a European security strategy. It was issued in 2003, but if you read about the risks and threats in the Black Sea area, you will find out they are still valid today. It’s a very good strategy. All the risks and threats that confront each of us in this area have been successfully identified.

Finally, some lessons learned from our experience throughout the years. First of all, you have to build a very flexible and dynamic system. You cannot wait for approvals that come in two years to transform your service.
You have to be able to transform your service as soon as possible, as soon as the challenge appears, and due to our organization, we can adapt very quickly to all these challenges.

I want to repeat that you have to increase manpower as well, in both quality and quantity. Today, conventional armed forces are reducing themselves. We have to increase intelligence; otherwise, you cannot cope with the risks and threats to your national security.

I mentioned already that you have to increase the pace of the decision making process by delegating responsibilities and introducing IT systems. You have to give to the systems processing capabilities, so the analysts will be able to get to the most relevant intelligence for their needs. The analysts should not need more time to gather intelligence than it takes to make the newspaper.

You have to implement the concept of all-source intelligence collection and production. I touched on this subject already, and I think we are doing pretty well, both at the technical level in operations and at the strategic level.

You have to employ a lot of linguists, and now we are facing a challenge with our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan because there have been a lot of surprises. We did not imagine such a deployment and to prepare the linguists in these languages, Arabic, Pashtun, and Dari, is not easy. You need a lot of time. So, you have to prepare for that.
You need a lot of IT specialists because IT systems are becoming more and more complex, and have to be changed all the time. You need IT specialists who understand today’s world. We talked yesterday about the Estonian case. And you need legal and financial experts as well. Intelligence is not an extremely expensive business, but still, it is expensive. You cannot operate without proper financial resources. You have to have the appropriate financial resources, and you have to be able to develop long term projects. You cannot develop a capability in a couple of days. You have to have long term projects, especially in SIGINT. That’s why we have succeeded in designing plans that spread over the next 10 or 15 years, and we are continuing that to try to spot new challenges and difficulties that we are going to face in the long term.

It is very important to collect intelligence from many sources because a single source cannot provide the intelligence you need all the time. Some conclusions: I would say that it does not matter to whom military intelligence is subordinated. It’s a part of the society, and it cannot be better or worse than the society itself. Second, we all have to do our best to be politically independent and, as far as Romania is concerned, I don’t think we have a difficulty in this area.

Of course, it’s necessary to become more efficient through modernization, and I told you already about the importance of long term planning, for example, in training your people in foreign languages. It’s a long term project, and we have to think about the future, about the areas of interest for Romania, for NATO, and for the EU.

**SHOULDs**

- WE SHOULD KNOW EACH OTHER BETTER
- WE SHOULD CO-OPERATE (SHARING INTELLIGENCE)
- WE SHOULD LEARN FROM EACH OTHER
- WE SHOULD MEET (AT LEAST ONCE A YEAR)
- WE SHOULD IDENTIFY AND SHARE OUR COMMON VALUES
I will say, and I’m sure everybody agrees, that military intelligence activity in a democratic state is normal, necessary, and legitimate as long as it is under the control of a democratic society. In Romania the minister of defense is a civilian and a member of a political party. So there is civilian control of the Ministry of Defense. On the other side, we are subordinated to the president on national security, and the president is elected by the people. In the parliament there are some commissions dealing with security issues, and they control us all the time, so there is full democratic control over all of our activities.

Of course, you have to take into account your national interests all the time when you develop new capabilities, but you can’t forget that you are a member state of some organizations, and you have to contribute to those organizations as well. A very important issue, in my opinion, is that the leader should be trained to understand, and use correctly, the intelligence that the organizations have access to. This is very important, and we are trying to educate our leaders before they become very big leaders. That is why we are teaching a lot of intel courses at the National Defense University and the National Defense College, the institutions that are preparing the future military and political military leaders. We are trying to explain to them what intelligence is, what intelligence can do, or what intelligence cannot do, and what they should expect from a military intelligence service.

I think we have had a good symposium. I think it will help us a lot in the future, because now we know each other. We will succeed in having bilateral visits to get to know each other better. I think everybody should think about what we should do from here. I think we should continue to get to know each other better. That means we should meet with each other. It’s not enough, one meeting per year. We cannot organize this symposium twice a year, or three times a year, but there are other mechanisms such as NATO. Some countries already have partnerships, but there are countries around the table with which we don’t have any relations, and it is my strong desire to develop such relationships, because it is in our common interest.

I think we should cooperate. Everybody has experience, and we should learn from each other’s experience. Finally, we should identify and share our common values because we have common values. We belong to the same area, and all the risks and threats that emerge from this area affect us all.

Let’s talk about what we shouldn’t do. I think we should not forget each other until the next symposium; we should be in touch. We should not let current issues overshadow cooperation. Very often everybody in this room is so concerned with the current issues that we forget the most important ones. We have to cooperate and find bilateral mechanisms to cooperate and to
help each other. Some of us have exchanged cards. If you have not exchanged cards with the others around the table, please don't miss this opportunity. We should not let barriers separate us; we are countries belonging to different organizations, with different mentalities, we are separated by seas and by land, but finally, as I mentioned, we have common goals. We have to contribute to the security in this area, so I think there should not be barriers preventing our cooperation. Last, I think we should not keep to ourselves what we have learned here. When we get back to our countries, I think it's better to share what we have discussed with our colleagues, with our subordinates, and with our leaders.

**PRESIDENT CLIFT:**

It is vital that if we are to meet the changes and opportunities of this era, we need partners, we need mutual trust, we need to share information, and we need the capability and interoperability to share such information. We are able to do so effectively at the unclassified level, and in doing so, we should learn from each other, and in learning from each other, we can advance the interests that we share. With that very brief summation, let me turn it over to all of you and let me open the floor for discussion. Please, sir.

**PARTICIPANT:**

I will start my speech with one story. A passenger ship in the ocean was destroyed by a strong storm. Only one passenger survived by getting to a
small island. He built up a shelter from the pieces of the destroyed ship, which were thrown on the shore by the waves. He started living with the hope that some day another ship or plane would pass nearby and would help him.

One day as he waited by himself, it suddenly started raining, and lightening hit his shelter and it burned. The man grabbed his head with both hands and started thinking. He was stressed, disappointed, and was thinking about what to do, to jump into the water and commit suicide or to stay on the island and be eaten during the night by wild animals.

Suddenly he saw a ship approaching him. In a few minutes, he was taken on the boat. The first question he asked the Captain was, "How did you find out that I was here and needed your help?" The Captain said, "The signal you gave us, the smoke." What is the conclusion from this? We are not decision makers, as intelligence officers. This is the job of our governments, and the leadership, of the alliance of the European Union or NATO. But we can give signals, and it is very important that these signals are clear, that these signals are timely, and that they help the leadership make the right decision.

We are here, as I understand, to build bridges: the bridges of trust, the bridges of security, and the bridges of sharing information against risks and threats. I think we should continue on this way, and my suggestion is that the next time, in our briefings, we should use more facts, not just history, not just the problems, not just saying, "Yes, one of the risks is terrorism. Another one is organized crime, narco-traff ic, and so on."

We already know the problems. We have to say, for example, in the period of one year, whether these risks are increasing, what is the level of these risks, and what is our responsibility? What do we have to do to fight them or discover them, and then take the appropriate measures?

Of course, it will not be easy. There are some problems, but we can start with unclassified information or just warnings of some problems and, step-by-step, continue when we find ways to protect the classified information and to share it, and I think this will be the best way to fight against the risks and threats in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea.

PRESIDENT CLIFT:

It is my pleasure to thank our panelists for their superb presentations, and to thank everyone who has participated in the panel. As I’ve listened over the past day and a half, the spirit expressed at this symposium reminds me of the name board carved on the old clipper ship Cutty Sark, and those words say, "Where there's a will, there's a way," and I think we're moving toward meeting that motto.

I thank all of you. My thanks in particular to our Romanian co-hosts and to the staff members of both the Romanian side and of my country, the
United States, who have worked so hard behind the scenes to make this a success. It has been a superb two days. In fact, it’s been a superb four days. You have provided us here in Constanza with a setting and hospitality that have contributed so importantly to the substantive goals that we have set for this 2007 symposium and, speaking for my college, I believe we together are meeting those goals. I thank the speakers and the panel chairs. I thank all in this room who have contributed. We have engaged in critical thinking, and we have engaged in discussion, and we have opened the door for future research and dialogue on the new ideas that have surfaced.

When we arrived, we had the pleasure of presenting you with the proceedings from the first symposium. We will now go to work with our colleagues here in Romania, to publish the proceedings of this symposium. We look forward to our future work together. Thank you very much. At this point, I’d like to turn the floor to the symposium co-chair from Romania, General Radici.

**GENERAL RADICI:**

First of all, I’d like to thank you all for your efforts to organize the symposium, and to thank all the nations that have attended this event. I think that it is very important to underline that the intelligence services in general and the military intelligence directorates in particular are those that opened the way. I say that because the intelligence that we provide and the directives that we follow from the political leadership open up new channels of communication for bilateral and multilateral relations. Thank you for being with us in our attempt to open up the world. To have your support, to know each other better, it is necessary that we should work together to be more open than we have been in the past, and that we should try to make an effective analysis of the threats and risks posed to our countries and to identify solutions to these situations, for our mutual benefit.

**GENERAL MAPLES:**

Carrying on from last year and what occurred at last year’s symposium, I think we have made some progress during this symposium. Although I’ll be honest with you that as I leave the symposium itself, I don’t feel that we have made as much progress as we could have and as we should have. I find it very positive, though, that we can come together in a room, such as this, and in fact, that we can bring up very sensitive issues and can discuss them amongst ourselves and that, while we may not come to an agreement, we can come to a greater understanding.

We mentioned early on in the conference that we are at a strategic crossroads. We are at a strategic crossroads geographically by our presence in
this region. But we are also at a strategic crossroads in time. There is change going on all around us. We’ve talked of transitions; transitions in government, transitions in strategy. Certainly, transitions in the threats and the concerns that are important to us all.

We’ve talked about transitions in international organizations and what these mean to regional security and, in a very general way, we have talked about common interests and common threats. I say that in a very general way because, as I listen to the dialogue from so many of you, you’re ready to go beyond what you already know, what you already understand and to get into the details of what our business is, as representatives of the defense intelligence organizations of our nations. My belief is that what I heard at this conference is that there is acceptance, that we want greater cooperation, that we want greater information sharing, and that we want the inclusion of other nations that are not present in this forum.

Specifically, we’ve talked about both Russia and Iran, whose presence is critical to our ability to understand and to come to conclusions or to move forward concerning issues within the region. But most important, in looking at this conference and where we are today, is how we move forward from where we are. What do we do about the dialogue and the successes that we’ve had? And we’ve had many successes as a result of this conference. But how do we move forward from here?

The panel that is still in front of us has talked about some of those ways. Others have included it in their presentations. We’ve had a number of proposals. The sharing of information, as opposed to the sharing of intelligence, is a first step, relying primarily on open source material, to move us forward, to continue to develop the trust, to develop the mechanisms by which information can be shared.

We’ve heard about education and training, and opportunities within education and training that can help us move forward. We have talked, to some extent, about the means to achieve that. Certainly, this annual symposium is one way to do that, but I believe that there are other ways that we need to explore, as to how information can be shared, face-to-face, through papers, with positions that are presented, through the meeting of our analysts who can discuss those issues, through the engagement of current forums and arrangements that already exist to move us forward.

I heard Brian Keller talk about building capacity, interoperability, and you had a note up there about a common architecture. I also heard about the exchange of business cards, through which contact can be made by telephone, by email. The means by which we move forward is critically important. My belief is that there is a community of interest in dealing specifically with issues. I think there are some specifics that we’ve got to get to, and we’ve
got to move past the generalities. We’ve got to get to the specifics. What is it that we want to share information on? What are these specifics? What are the facts that we need to deal in, and then how do we do that? How do we move this forward? How do we move it forward without waiting a year for our next symposium?

I believe we are at the stage now where we can move this forward in a more rapid way. I believe that there is a desire to share and to cooperate, and now we’ve got to get to the specifics and take action to do that and then be able to measure and assess how well we’re doing.

So, I ask you, and I would ask you that before we close out of the symposium, that perhaps between now and the end of dinner tonight, to make some notes and tell those who have organized the symposium, Mr. Clift or General Savu, what the issues are that you would like to have discussed at next year’s symposium? If you’ve already got some ideas on that, while this is fresh in your mind, write them down, get them to Mr. Clift and General Savu. Second, what’s our action plan? What steps are we going to take to move forward? Specifics, in terms of moving forward on information, as opposed to intelligence, open source exchange, or analytic exchange. What are the means whereby we are going to do that? Should we in thirty days identify what the information requirements are that we desire to exchange information on? Perhaps in sixty days or ninety days arrange a meeting of our analysts to discuss those topics. And perhaps, by next year’s symposium, be able to focus the symposium on presentations by the nations dealing with the specifics and the facts that we are all interested in.

And what are the means by which we should share information? There are multiple ways to do that. One way that comes to me is my relationship with my attachés. Attachés from the United States, and also with the foreign defense attachés in Washington, D.C., with whom I have the opportunity to meet on a fairly regular basis and certainly have the opportunity to have discussions with.

What are the information technology solutions to the kinds of things we heard this panel talk about, and how do we explore them? Who takes the lead to try to bring that together, so that we have a means by which information can be shared, because I think we need to arrive at that and to move that forward. So, I would ask you, your thoughts now, your thoughts and impressions. Try to leave something with the organizers of the conference, as to how we take the next concrete, actionable steps to move forward, to achieve greater cooperation and a greater ability to share information.

It has been a real honor for me to have the opportunity to spend the weekend here, to meet with so many of you and, in particular, our hosts from
Romania. Again, I thank them, I thank those who have organized the conference and likewise, I would like to wish the best to each of you, the delegates. I’d also like to thank all of those who made presentations during the course of the conference, and I know that many of them have had to depart in order to catch flights for other engagements. But I appreciate their knowledge, their expertise, and their willingness to come and to share and to be a part of this conference, and I wish you all the best. I hope it’s not a year before I see you again and that we have the opportunity to make a difference in the world.

**PRESIDENT CLIFT:**

This concludes the symposium. Thank you all very much.
HOSTED SOCIAL EVENTS

On the Saturday and Sunday prior to the conference the Romanian hosts entertained visitors, giving them a chance to adjust to jet lag and to meet in an informal setting. While briefings were given aboard the Romanian Navy Ship Muresu during a cruise on the Danube, informal tours included the Murfatlar Wine Region and the beautiful Romanian Black Sea resort communities near Constanta.

MG Radici (center) greets LTG Maples (right) at the airport in Constanta before the beginning of the conference, aided by MG Radici’s interpreter (left).

Romanian international soccer star, Gheorghe Hagi (right) and MG Radici (left) present a signed jersey to LTG Maples at the IAKI hotel in Constanta.
As part of the cultural tours during the symposium, participants traveled to Murfatlar for a seminar on one of the oldest and most successful vineyard regions in Romania.

The location of the conference was Hotel IAKI, located in the center of Mamaia, Constanta, and built in 1956. Acquired by HAGI Sport Company, the unit was thoroughly renovated and modernized to meet (or exceed) international hospitality standards in its class.
After touring the Murfatlar vineyard, the participants enjoyed a luncheon on the historic grounds.
LTG Michael D. Maples and Mrs. Lynne Maples, along with several international delegates visited the Murfatlar vineyard during a cultural outing.

The Murfatlar is an important wine region in Romania, located just off the Black Sea in the region of Dobrogea. It averages 300 days of sunshine a year and the proximity to the Black Sea leads to an excellent climate for grape culture and wine production. Murfatlar is renowned for its sweet wines, and the visitors enjoyed the tour of one of the prominent winery and the chances to enjoy excellent cuisine.
Symposium attendees listen to a briefing on asymmetric threats for the region by Dr. Dan Burghart, NDIC Faculty.

Part of the charm of the trip was the chance to have briefings while on a tour up the Danube River on the Romanian ship “Muresul.” The historic Danube starts in Germany and flows through several countries, and is part of the watershed for a dozen European countries. As a main thoroughfare, it has been at the heart of movement through Eastern Europe for eons. Even the ancient Romans used this river, and to this day the Romanian language, as a Romance language, is derived from the Latin spoken by these early invaders.

The briefings on the ship gave participants the chance to learn, share ideas, and to see the beauty and history of the region.

As part of the broader theme of the conference, the entertainment included cultural performances by local dancers and the chance to enjoy the local cuisine. The participants enjoyed the outings and took time to relax between sessions and enjoy the hospitality of the Romanian hosts.
Participants enjoyed a night of traditional Romanian music and dancing at a formal dinner at the seaside Ciresica Restaurant in Tulcea, Romania.
CLOSING REMARKS

NEXT SYMPOSIUM

On 9-13 June 2008, Major Irakli Kurasbediani, Georgia, Head of the Military Intelligence Department (M.I.D.) and Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, USA, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (D.I.A.) will host the third edition of the Symposium on Black Sea and Caspian Sea Security Issues at the "IN TOURIST Hotel," Batumi, Georgia.

The purpose is to continue developing the successful academic dialogue established in the first and second Symposiums, (Washington D.C., March 2006; Constanza, Romania, May 2007), as well as to promote regional relationships and cooperation in the region.

In the spirit of the first and second editions of the symposium, this third edition will also be conducted in a non-attribution, academic environment and is not intended to be an intelligence exchange conference, but rather a forum to discuss key regional security issues common to the Black Sea and Caspian Sea nations. The event will be co-hosted by the Military Intelligence Department (M.I.D.) – Georgia and the U.S. National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC).